The Boundaries and Humility of Strategy

By Dr. Tong Yin (殷彤博士) · InsightBridge Global LLC

An analysis and a set of suggestions on corporate strategy formulation.

What this essay seeks to discuss is not whether any single company was right or wrong, but a far more universal question — one every operator deserves to take seriously: in an era undergoing violent reversal, how should an enterprise formulate its strategy? We will use New Oriental's recent pivot from after-school education into cultural tourism as our analytical sample — not to pass judgment, but because it happens to display, in full, several of the most easily overlooked junctures in strategy-making. What happened there carries sincere and valuable lessons for every enterprise now standing at the crossroads of transformation.

I. The First Principle of Strategy: Capability, Not the Tailwind

In the theoretical lineage of corporate strategy, the “unrelated diversification” that swept the globe in the 1990s has long been shown, through extensive empirical study, to be a high-risk road. The modern consensus leans toward two things instead: either deepen the core business until it is done to perfection, or extend along the value chain into “vertical integration” anchored on existing core capabilities. The logic beneath this is plain and profound — an enterprise's true moat is its own distinctive core capability, not whether the industry it sits in happens to be fashionable.

The most common, and most insidious, error in strategy-making is to equate “an industry favored by the state and the times” directly with “an industry in which this particular enterprise holds an advantage and can make money.”

When an enterprise built on knowledge dissemination and family trust turns to enter the tourism business, it must calmly ask itself one question: do the core capabilities accumulated over the past thirty years still count on this new battlefield? Education and tourism both belong to the service sector, yet their underlying supply chains, core assets, and profit models scarcely overlap. The former's strength lies in content, faculty, and brand trust — a classic “soft power”; the latter must confront the entire heavy, hard supply chain of food, lodging, transport, sightseeing, shopping, and entertainment. When soft power cannot be directly converted into a competitive barrier on the new field, what is called cross-sector expansion is, in essence, stepping from a familiar position into an unfamiliar domain where one holds no resource advantage. This is not to say it cannot be done — only that one must soberly recognize that, at this moment, you stand at almost the same starting line as a brand-new entrepreneur.

II. Respecting the Logic of the Value Chain: Asset-Light Genes on an Asset-Heavy Battlefield

If one must cross sectors, the safest path is “related diversification” — extending naturally upstream or downstream along existing core capabilities so that old and new businesses form genuine synergy and complement. For an enterprise holding vast resources of middle-class and high-net-worth families, the most logical vertical extension should revolve around “the lifelong growth and intellectual services of high-net-worth families,” rather than leaping abruptly into a wholly new industry whose supply chain barely overlaps with its own.

An even more cautionary issue is this: using the operating genes of an “asset-light” model to fight an “asset-heavy” war.

Education is a classic asset-light model — rent a few classrooms, hire a few teachers, and when enrollment falters, you can give up the lease and adjust at any time; the pivot is swift and the sunk cost minimal. Tourism is precisely the opposite: laying down branch offices across the country, maintaining large full-time teams, and building physical retail networks all entail enormous fixed and sunk costs. The fundamental mismatch between these two business genes means that once the market cools, the “retreat at any time” flexibility of the former becomes, in the face of the latter, the heavy burden of “being unable to turn around.” In strategy-making, a judgment about an industry's “asset structure” is often more critical than a judgment about its “growth prospects” — because prospects determine the ceiling, while asset structure determines whether you can survive the winter.

III. Reverence for Common Sense: Some Trends Need Not Wait for the Era to Reveal Them

In fairness, we must say this plainly: time is an enormous variable. Around 2023, the world had just emerged from an extraordinary period, and most business leaders held generally optimistic expectations about the recovery of global trade, the rebound of inbound and outbound travel, and the resilience of middle-class consumption. The subsequent sharp turn of the international landscape toward trade protectionism and regionalization did indeed exceed what most people foresaw at the time. To attribute that portion to “an era hard to read clearly” is honest and fair.

Yet the true difficulty of strategy-making lies in clearly distinguishing the “variables the era has not yet revealed” from the “facts long written into common sense.”

Some underlying trends were already open common sense in 2023, requiring no wait for the era's final verdict. First, the explosive dividend of outbound travel had already peaked back in 2018–2019, before the extraordinary period, and the industry had entered a phase of grinding within a fixed stock — hardly a blind spot for any enterprise that had cultivated Chinese families for thirty years. Second, the labor market's rational re-pricing of the “overseas-returnee premium” had made the gap between heavy study-abroad spending and post-return income increasingly evident, a social consensus that had likewise long taken shape. Third, and most fundamentally: China is a market acutely sensitive to price. This is precisely why giants like Trip.com, Tongcheng, and Fliggy, after more than two decades in the trenches, have long been willing to accept low margins and battle relentlessly on cost-performance — they understand the temperature of these waters better than anyone. When a new entrant launches premium product lines priced in the tens of thousands, the question it must answer is not “is this product good,” but “amid slowing growth and tightening wallets, how many people can and will pay for it, frequently?”

IV. Ambition and Capacity: A Niche Business Cannot Support a Mass Empire

There is a plain principle in modern strategy, often overlooked: the scale and ambition of an enterprise must be commensurate with the true capacity of its target market. A refined niche business may be a perfectly fitting home for a small or mid-sized company — living comfortably and with dignity on a few high-quality boutique projects that yield handsome annual profit. But the very same business, when a giant burdened with grand narrative and the pressure of public listing insists on building it into a sprawling nationwide map, changes in nature entirely.

When enormous fixed costs are spread across a niche market that is inherently limited and actively shrinking, the arithmetic of revenue against cost may be impossible to balance from the very first day.

Products like premium cultural tours and wellness retreats can attract the apex of the wealthy to sample them occasionally, but struggle to form high-frequency, high-volume repeat consumption. Moreover, Chinese travel habits differ markedly from the Western vacation culture of “staying still in one scenic place for a week or two” — most people, including the considerably affluent, still instinctively prefer “short, fast, and frequent” itineraries. Under such real constraints, using the vast fixed overhead of branch offices, office space, and full-time teams across dozens of cities to chase a low-probability premium conversion is, structurally, a gamble with poor odds. This reminds us: strategy is not a contest over whose dream is bigger, but over who sees more accurately how large a dream the market can actually bear.

V. Grayscale Testing: Leaving Strategy the Flexibility to Correct Course

In cross-sector investment, the mature approach is “small steps, fast iteration, grayscale testing” — first validating the profit model in a single market, confirming it genuinely works, before scaling the capital replication. This method seems slow, but it in fact preserves the most precious thing of all: the flexibility to correct course at any time according to real feedback.

When an enterprise holds ample cash on its books while bearing immense transformation anxiety, it does indeed tend toward “staking everything on one battle” — committing vast capital all at once and rolling out nationwide before adequately validating the core proposition (for instance, “will the target clientele pay for high-priced experiential consumption over the long term and at high frequency?”). Such all-or-nothing expansion, once it meets shifts in the international and domestic landscape, leaves the enterprise without the financial flexibility to adjust in time. To leave room for trial and error is not a lack of decisiveness, but the most mature form of respect for uncertainty.

VI. Closing: For Every Operator in Transition

Returning to the case itself, we cast no blame. Place the enterprise back in that moment of 2023, cornered against the wall by a sudden policy shift — holding billions in cash on hand, shouldering the livelihoods of tens of thousands of employees, and carrying thirty years of accumulated brand sentiment. To make the decision to “start over” was, in itself, a kind of responsibility and courage worthy of respect. Every operator who still chooses to move forward in dire straits deserves to be understood with goodwill.

The true value of this case lies not in its gains and losses, but in how clearly it illuminates those principles of strategy-making that should never be overlooked.

It gently reminds us that in this new era of reversed geo-economic order and rising isolationism, corporate strategy-making must return from the pursuit of grand narrative to the safeguarding of core capability and the reverence for basic common sense. Respect the logic of value-chain extension, prudently assess the asset structure of unfamiliar domains, keep the true capacity of the market clearly in view, and always preserve a measure of flexibility for correcting course — these are not shackles that bind ambition, but guardrails that allow ambition to travel steadily and far. May every operator now standing at the crossroads of transformation hold both the courage to break through and the lucidity about boundaries and the reverence for common sense. This, perhaps, is the deepest wisdom of strategy-making in this uncertain age.

Afterword · Written in a spirit of goodwill, this essay uses a single concrete cross-sector case merely as a mirror reflecting the principles of strategy. All analysis aims to explore the universal question of “how strategy ought to be formulated,” rather than to judge the success or failure of any enterprise or individual.

时代转向中的"战略刻舟求剑"

作者：殷彤博士（Dr. Tong Yin） · InsightBridge Global LLC

一篇关于企业战略制定的分析与建议。

这篇文章想谈的，不是某一家企业的对错，而是一个更普遍、也更值得每一位经营者认真对待的命题：在一个正在剧烈转向的时代里，企业应当如何制定战略。我们会以新东方近年从教培向文旅的跨界转型作为分析样本——不是为了评判，而是因为它恰好完整地呈现了战略制定中几个最容易被忽略的关键环节。它身上发生的一切，对所有正处在转型十字路口的企业，都有着真诚而宝贵的借鉴意义。

一、战略的第一性原理：能力，而非风口

在企业战略管理的理论谱系里，上世纪 90 年代曾风靡全球的"无关多元化"（Unrelated Diversification），早已被大量实证研究证明是一条高风险的道路。现代战略共识更倾向于两件事：要么深耕主业，把一件事做到极致；要么围绕核心能力，向产业链的上下游做"纵向一体化"延伸。这背后的逻辑朴素而深刻——企业真正的护城河，是它独有的核心能力，而不是它所处的行业是否热门。

战略制定中最常见、也最隐蔽的一个误区，就是把"国家与时代支持的风口行业"，直接等同于"本企业有优势、能赚钱的行业"。

当一家以知识传播和家庭信任见长的企业，转身进入旅游业时，它需要冷静地自问一个问题：我过去三十年积累下来的核心能力，在新的战场上还算不算数？教培与文旅同属服务业，但两者的底层供应链、核心资产与盈利模式几乎毫无重叠。前者的优势在于内容、师资与品牌信任，是典型的"软实力"；后者却要直面"吃、住、行、游、购、娱"这一整套沉重的硬性供应链。当软实力无法直接转化为新战场上的竞争壁垒时，所谓的跨界，本质上就是从一个自己熟悉的阵地，迈入了一个毫无资源优势的陌生领域。这并非不能做，而是必须清醒地认识到：此时此刻，你和一个全新的创业者，站在几乎相同的起跑线上。

二、尊重产业链规律：轻资产基因与重资产战场

如果一定要跨界，最稳妥的路径是"相关多元化"——沿着已有的核心能力，向上游或下游自然延伸，让新旧业务之间形成真正的协同与互补。对于一家手握大量中产与高净值家庭资源的企业而言，最符合逻辑的纵向延伸，理应是围绕"高净值家庭的终身成长与智力服务"展开，而非贸然跳入一个供应链重叠度极低的全新行业。

一个更值得警惕的问题是：用"轻资产"的经营基因，去打一场"重资产"的战争。

教培是典型的轻资产模式——租几间教室、聘几位老师，招生不顺时随时可以退租、调整，掉头极快，沉没成本极低。文旅则恰恰相反：在全国各地铺设分公司、维持大批全职团队、布局线下实体网点，这些都是巨大的固定成本与沉没成本。两种商业基因的根本错配，意味着一旦市场降温，前者那种"随时撤退"的灵活，在后者面前会变成"难以掉头"的沉重负担。战略制定时，对一个行业"资产结构"的判断，往往比对它"成长前景"的判断更为关键——因为前景决定上限，而资产结构决定你能否在寒冬中活下来。

三、敬畏常识：有些趋势，不必等到时代揭晓

我们必须公允地说一句：时间是个巨大的变量。2023 年前后，全球刚刚走出特殊时期，多数商业领袖对全球化贸易回暖、出入境复苏、以及中产消费韧性，普遍抱有乐观预期。后来国际局势向贸易保护与区域化的急剧转向，确实超出了当时大多数人的预判。把这部分归因于"时代难以看清"，是诚实而公道的。

然而，战略制定真正的难处在于：要把"时代尚未揭晓的变量"，与"早已写在常识里的事实"，清晰地区分开来。

有些底层趋势，在 2023 年其实已是公开的常识，并不需要等待时代的最终判决。其一，出境游的爆发式红利，早在特殊时期之前的 2018 至 2019 年就已见顶，行业进入存量内卷阶段，这对任何一家深耕中国家庭三十年的企业而言，本不应是盲区。其二，国内人才市场对"海归溢价"的理性回归，使得高额留学投入与回国收入之间的落差日益明显，这一社会共识同样早已形成。其三，也是最根本的一点：中国是一个对价格高度敏感的市场。这正是携程、同程、飞猪等深耕二十余年的巨头长期甘于低毛利、死磕性价比的根本原因——它们比任何人都更清楚这片市场的水温。当一个新进入者推出动辄上万、数万元的高端产品线时，它需要回答的，不是"这个产品好不好"，而是"在经济放缓、钱包收紧的当下，究竟有多少人能够并且愿意高频地为它买单"。

四、雄心与容量：小众生意撑不起大众帝国

现代战略中有一条朴素却常被忽视的匹配原则：企业的体量与雄心，必须与目标市场的真实容量相称。一门精致的小众生意，对一家中小公司而言，可能是恰到好处的归宿——靠几个高品质的精品项目，一年赚取可观的利润，活得从容而体面。但同样一门生意，若被一家承载着宏大叙事与上市压力的巨头，硬要做成覆盖全国的庞大版图，性质就完全变了。

当庞大的固定成本，去分摊一个本就有限、且正在收缩的细分市场时，收入与成本的账，可能从第一天起就难以做平。

高端文化游、康养度假这类产品，能够吸引塔尖的富裕人群偶发性地体验，却很难形成高频、大体量的重复消费。更何况，中国消费者的旅游习惯，与欧美"在一处风景里静住一两周"的度假文化存在显著差异——大多数人，包括相当富裕的人群，骨子里偏好的仍是"短平快"的行程。在这样的现实约束下，用全国数十座城市的分公司、写字楼与全职团队所构成的庞大固定开支，去博取一个极小概率的高端转化，从财务结构上看，是一场胜算不高的豪赌。这提醒我们：战略不是比谁的梦想更大，而是比谁对"市场能承载多大的梦想"看得更准。

五、灰度测试：给战略留出修正的弹性

在跨领域投资中，成熟的做法是"小步快跑、灰度测试"——先在单一市场验证盈利模型，确认其确实跑得通，再进行资本的规模化复制。这种方式看似缓慢，实则是为战略保留了最宝贵的东西：根据真实反馈随时修正航向的弹性。

当一家企业账面现金充足、又承受着巨大的转型焦虑时，确实容易倾向于"毕其功于一役"，在尚未充分验证核心命题（例如"目标客群是否愿意长期、高频地为高价精神消费买单"）之前，便一次性投入巨额资本、在全国铺开。这种孤注一掷的扩张，一旦遇上国际与国内局势的变化，企业便会因为缺乏财务弹性，而失去及时调整的余地。留出试错的空间，不是不够果断，而是对不确定性最成熟的尊重。

六、结语：献给所有转型中的经营者

回到这个案例本身，我们不带任何指责。把企业放回 2023 年那个被政策骤变逼到墙角的时刻，手握数十亿账面现金、肩负数万名员工的生计、又有着三十年沉淀的品牌情怀，做出"再创业"的决断，本身就是一种值得尊敬的担当与勇气。每一个在绝境中仍选择向前的经营者，都理应得到善意的理解。

这个案例真正的价值，不在于它的得失成败，而在于它清晰地照见了战略制定中那几条不应被忽视的规律。

它温和地提醒我们：在这个地缘经济格局逆转、孤立主义抬头的全新时代，企业的战略制定，需要从对宏大叙事的追逐，回归到对核心能力的坚守与对基本常识的敬畏。尊重产业链的延伸规律，审慎评估陌生领域的资产结构，把市场的真实容量看在眼里，并始终为战略保留一份修正的弹性——这些并非束缚雄心的枷锁，而是让雄心得以行稳致远的护栏。愿每一位正站在转型十字路口的经营者，都能既怀有破局的勇气，又不失对边界的清醒与对常识的敬畏。这，或许就是这个不确定时代里，战略制定最深的智慧。

后记 · 本文以善意为出发点，仅将一个具体的跨界案例作为映照战略规律的镜子。所有分析旨在探讨"战略如何制定"这一普遍命题，而非评判任何企业或个人的成败。