制裁与腐败：伊朗冲突风险分析

据devpolicy.org报道，美国对伊朗的制裁政策长期以来基于一个核心假设：通过施加经济痛苦来迫使政权妥协。然而，这种单向的评估往往忽略了制裁在腐败体制下的复杂传导机制。本文深入探讨了为何在伊朗等腐败严重的国家，严厉的经济制裁反而可能适得其反，不仅未能削弱政府，反而可能成为滋生新权贵阶层的温床。

文章指出，制裁往往针对的是那些本身就存在特权网络和裙带关系的系统。当正常的贸易渠道被切断，稀缺资源往往通过政治关系进行分配，而非市场机制。以伊朗为例，像Babak Zanjani这样的“信托人”利用制裁漏洞倒卖石油，积累了巨额财富，而普通民众和中产阶级却因此丧失了议价能力。这种财富的极端集中削弱了社会对政治系统的信任，降低了政治暴力的机会成本。

这种现象并非伊朗独有。从萨达姆时期的伊拉克到叙利亚，再到委内瑞拉的马杜罗政权，历史案例表明，国际制裁与腐败的结合往往为战争投机者和政治掮客创造了暴利机会。研究显示，在腐败程度较高的国家，制裁带来的经济冲击更容易转化为社会动荡。

为了验证这一理论，作者Mohammad Reza Farzanegan与Mohamad Alkurdi Albarawi在2026年发表的研究中，分析了122个国家1996年至2020年的数据。该研究利用全球制裁数据库和V-Dem腐败指数发现，腐败程度越高，制裁引发内部冲突（以冲突相关死亡人数衡量）的可能性就越大。这意味着，对于投资者和政策制定者而言，评估制裁效果时必须将目标国的制度性腐败作为关键变量。

According to devpolicy.org, US sanctions on Iran are predicated on the assumption that economic pressure will weaken the regime and force concessions. However, this analysis reveals a critical paradox: in highly corrupt systems, sanctions can inadvertently empower a new elite class. Rather than weakening the government, these measures often create opportunities for rent-seeking and crony capitalism, potentially increasing the risk of conflict.

The article highlights that sanctions disrupt normal trade channels, encouraging smuggling and opaque financial intermediaries. In Iran, figures like Babak Zanjani have profited from facilitating oil sales under restrictions, amassing fortunes while the broader population suffers. This dynamic creates a new wealthy class that accumulates status through political connections, eroding trust in the political system and lowering the opportunity cost of political violence.

Historical precedents, including Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the Maduro regime in Venezuela, demonstrate that sanctions interact with corruption to create opportunities for war profiteers. The text argues that countries with higher levels of corruption are more vulnerable to the destabilizing effects of sanctions, as the economic shock is absorbed by a privileged few rather than the state apparatus.

To quantify this risk, the authors examined 122 countries from 1996 to 2020. Their study, published in the *European Journal of Political Economy* in 2026, found a significant correlation between corruption levels and the likelihood of sanctions-induced internal conflict. The data suggests that without addressing the underlying institutional environment, sanctions may fail to achieve their strategic objectives and instead fuel domestic instability.