何为真正的战略：从马来西亚的主动选择看「中立幻想」的边界

战略不是等待局势明朗后的应对，也不是把模糊无限期维持下去。它是在结果尚不确定时，对未来作出可检验的判断；确定主要战略方向；提前配置政治、经济与组织资源；并承担机会成本。马来西亚总理安瓦尔·易卜拉欣近期的公开表态，提供了一个有价值、也必须谨慎解读的案例：一国可以在特定议题上作出有边界的主要靠拢，同时保留其他重要关系与战术弹性。真正需要质疑的，不是中立或不结盟本身，而是“只要保持中立，就自然能够换来安全与发展”的舒适假设。

一、战略与反应之间，差的是“提前承担”

许多被称为战略的行为，其实只是反应：危机发生后调整措辞，对手行动后重新排序，市场确认后才投资。反应可以必要，也可以高效，但它并不自动构成战略。

真正的战略至少包含五个相互约束的要素。第一，前瞻判断：对权力、技术、资本、地理与制度变化提出关于未来的假设。第二，主动定位：在外部压力迫使自己表态之前，先决定希望占据什么位置。第三，主次排序：确认何者是某一议题、某一时期的战略主轴，何者是需要维持的次要关系。第四，资源先置：在结果尚未确定时，先投入外交注意力、产业能力、资本与组织信誉。第五，机会成本：承认每一项优先选择都会减少其他选项的空间。

因此，“选边”在本文中不是全面臣服、永久忠诚，也不是与其他伙伴决裂。它指的是有边界、分议题、可复核的战略靠拢：在明确的领域和时间范围内，选择一个主要战略锚点，同时保留次要关系、制度护栏与调整条件。没有这种限定，选边容易成为依附；没有主次排序，多元关系又可能退化为没有决断期限的拖延。

二、永久模糊为什么也会产生成本

中立、不结盟与战略对冲都有真实价值。它们能够降低被卷入冲突的风险，扩大交易对象，并保留后备选项。学者郭清水（Cheng-Chwee Kuik）将对冲概括为高不确定性、高利害情境下的“保险寻求”行为：国家避免刚性选边，同时对竞争大国采取方向相反的措施，以保留退路。[1]

但保险不是免费午餐。长期模糊可能产生至少四类成本：伙伴不愿为一个始终不肯排序的国家提供稀缺资源；产业政策无法围绕清晰的技术与市场架构配置；危机时选择权可能在压力下骤然消失；而当各方都相信该国不会承担关系成本时，其承诺的议价价值也会下降。郭清水本人也强调，对冲并非万能药，它同样带来依赖、被抛弃、被牵连和回旋空间收缩等风险。[1]

所以，本文挑战的不是中立国家，也不是非结盟传统，而是一种未经证明的因果信念：仿佛不作优先排序，本身就能保证安全与发展。安全来自能力、可信的关系与可执行的退路；发展来自生产率、市场连接、资本与制度质量。中立有时能服务这些目标，却不能替代它们。

三、安瓦尔案例：清晰信号，而非全面改旗易帜

2026年8月16日，安瓦尔在半岛电视台专访中说：“I see Taiwan as part of China, period.” 当主持人追问中国若使用武力、他是否会谴责时，安瓦尔以马来西亚的假设性分离情境回应，称自己会维护国家的神圣性与统一；主持人再问“所以，你会使用武力？”他回答“Yes”。[2]

证据边界必须说清。确切引语是上述话语；可观察事实是他没有直接回答是否会谴责中国使用武力；合理推论是这套类比与北京的国家统一叙事高度相容，可被理解为不愿谴责、甚至在该特定框架中为使用武力提供理由；但不能据此声称安瓦尔明确支持某次入侵或批准任何具体军事方案。台湾外交部随后称其“公开合理化”中国以武力统一台湾的立场，这是台湾政府的正式解读，应当归因呈现，而不是冒充采访逐字事实。[3]

这次表态也不是凭空创造的新政策。1974年建交公报中，马来西亚承认中华人民共和国政府为中国唯一合法政府，并“知悉”中方关于台湾是中华人民共和国领土不可分割一部分的立场。[4] 2025年中马联合声明的措辞更为明确：马方重申一个中国政策，称台湾是中华人民共和国不可分割的领土，并表示不支持“台独”。[5] 2026年的采访，是对既有政策的修辞强化，而非新条约、新联盟或外交承认的改变。

然而，它仍具有战略意义。原因不在于一句话能够自动换来投资——没有证据证明存在交换，也不能把2025年的投资批准归因于2026年的采访——而在于安瓦尔在中国界定为核心利益的议题上，发出了显著偏向北京叙事的高可见度信号。它体现了主动定位：在外部事件迫使吉隆坡作答之前，先表明特定议题的权重排序。

这一判断必须放进经济结构中检验。2025年，中国连续第十七年成为马来西亚最大贸易伙伴，双边贸易额为5422亿林吉特；美国则是第三大贸易伙伴，贸易额3658亿林吉特。[6] 同年，马来西亚批准的外来投资中，新加坡为583亿林吉特，中国为580亿林吉特，美国为151亿林吉特；“批准投资”并不等于已经实现的资本流入。[7] 这些数字说明中国具有结构性分量，却不证明排他性，更不证明采访带来了物质回报。

四、主要战略方向可以与次要灵活性共存

若据此断言“马来西亚已经全面选择中国”，证据并不支持。就在采访前约六周，安瓦尔公开称马来西亚外交将保持“fiercely independent, proactive and non-aligned”，主张“采取立场，但不选阵营”，并表示武力或胁迫会加深怨恨与意外后果。[8] 这种一般性反对武力的表述，与其后来采用的分离类比存在张力；现有证据无法判断这是议题层级不同，还是修辞不一致。

马来西亚也继续经营其他重要关系。2025年10月，马美关系提升为全面战略伙伴关系，合作覆盖贸易投资、先进技术、防务安全、能源安全与地区稳定。[9] 2025年，台湾仍是马来西亚第四大贸易伙伴，双边贸易额达2330.2亿林吉特，且关系集中于电子、半导体零部件和机械供应链。[10] 安瓦尔本人在2025年伦敦政治经济学院演讲中称，同时维持与中美的稳健关系不是零和选择，而是建立多元经济基础、减少对单一伙伴过度依赖的“战略必要”。[11]

因此，更准确的描述是：马来西亚在一个中国与国家统一叙事上，向北京作出有边界、分议题的靠拢；与此同时，它继续通过对美战略合作、对台商业联系及自身不结盟话语维持对冲。这不是逻辑矛盾，而可能是一种组合式战略：主要战略方向负责建立优先顺序，次要关系负责分散风险；原则边界负责防止主要关系演变为外部否决权。

主要方向也不必在所有领域指向同一伙伴。一个国家可以在市场与产业网络上以中国为重要锚点，在技术、资本或安全领域维持美国及其他伙伴，在海洋权益上坚持国际法与自身立场。2025年中马联合声明在扩展贸易、人工智能、5G、半导体、港口和能源合作的同时，也主张依据国际法与《联合国海洋法公约》和平处理南海争议。[5] 战略的成熟，不在于关系单一，而在于层级清楚、边界可信。

五、真正的战略必须允许自己被证伪

主动选择不是免除风险，而是把风险从隐性变为可管理。马来西亚这一路径至少面临五项检验。

第一，经济集中。 若对中国市场、资本或产业体系的依赖增长快于马来西亚自身能力，主要锚点会转化为不对称杠杆。第二，回旋空间。 若美国、台湾或其他伙伴因政治信号而减少技术、投资或安全合作，次要关系可能无法继续承担保险功能。台湾政府已经公开警告相关言论可能影响台商信心；这是风险提示，不是投资必然下降的证明。[3]

第三，国内合法性。 对外定位必须能向国内不同地区、产业与社群解释；否则外部收益可能被内部不信任抵消。第四，反制与牵连。 越明确的靠拢，越可能招致贸易限制、技术管制或被卷入伙伴争端。第五，预测错误。 如果所押注的增长、技术或权力趋势没有实现，提前配置的资源会成为沉没成本。

这也提供了可证伪标准：若未来数年，马来西亚在获取产业升级和市场机会方面没有取得相对改善，却显著失去技术来源、投资多样性、南海政策自主或国内支持，那么这项定位就不能仅凭“有远见”自我辩护。反之，如果它在保持美台及其他关系的同时，将对华联系转化为生产率、人才和本土能力，并维持海洋与外交自主，那么有边界的主要靠拢就显示出战略成效。战略不是以姿态证明正确，而是以预先设定的结果、成本与修正点接受检验。

六、给政治与商业领导者的六问

安瓦尔案例对企业董事会同样适用。企业也常把“保留所有选项”误当成战略：迟迟不选技术架构，不确定核心市场，不在人才与供应链上提前下注。结果是选择看似更多，组织能力却没有在任何方向上形成复利。

在批准任何所谓战略前，领导者应回答六个问题：

主要方向究竟针对哪个议题，而非抽象地“站在哪一边”？

时间范围多长，何时复核？

哪些资本、人才、产能与信誉必须在结果确定前投入？

机会成本由谁承担，是否已进入决策账本？

哪些次要关系与后备方案必须保留？

哪些可观察变化会触发加码、暂停或转向？

真正的战略不是对未来拥有确定性，而是在不确定中建立有纪律的承诺。它既不同于被动反应，也不同于把平衡本身当作永久目的。马来西亚的案例最值得关注之处，不是它是否已经永久“选定一个阵营”，而是它展示了：一个坚持战略自主的国家，仍可以在特定核心议题上形成清晰的主次关系。

中立可以是一种工具；对冲可以是一套保险；不结盟可以是一项自主原则。但没有任何一个词能够自动提供安全或繁荣。真正的战略要求领导者在未来尚未给出答案时，就说明何者为主、资源如何配置、代价由谁承担、何时承认判断有误。它不是消除不确定性，而是先于不确定性采取可负责、可修正、也可被检验的行动。

中文注释与来源

• [1] Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Getting hedging right: a small-state perspective,” China International Strategy Review (2021): https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8608573/

• [2] Al Jazeera, “Anwar Ibrahim: Malaysia between the superpowers,” 16 August 2026（相关对话约16:11–19:00）: https://www.aljazeera.com/video/the-india-report/2026/8/16/anwar-ibrahim-malaysia-between-the-superpowers ; 视频：https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ifKz9ZYSwo

• [3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), 18 August 2026: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&s=122919

• [4] Malaysia–PRC Joint Communiqué, 31 May 1974: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2732_663468/2733_663470/202406/t20240607_11410603.html

• [5] Malaysia–China Joint Statement, 17 April 2025: https://hk.ocmfa.gov.cn/eng/xjpzxzywshd/202504/t20250417_11595814.htm

• [6] Department of Statistics Malaysia, “External Trade Statistics, Malaysia, 2025”: https://www.dosm.gov.my/portal-main/release-content/external-trade-statistics-malaysia2025

• [7] Malaysian Investment Development Authority, 6 March 2026: https://www.mida.gov.my/media-release/malaysia-breaks-investment-record-with-rm426-7-billion-in-2025-up-11-year-on-year-creating-over-240000-new-jobs/

• [8] Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia, 39th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, 2 July 2026: https://www.pmo.gov.my/en/speeches-en/verbatim-text-yab-pm-question-and-answer-session-at-the-39th-asia-pacific-rountable-apr/

• [9] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Malaysia–United States Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, 26 October 2025: https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/-/malaysia-and-the-united-states-elevates-bilateral-relations-to-comprehensive-strategic-partnership

• [10] Taiwan International Trade Administration, Malaysia–Taiwan trade, 2025: https://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=45&pid=810540

• [11] Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia, “The Adaptive Edge: Malaysia’s Global Strategy in an Uncertain Era,” LSE, 17 January 2025: https://www.pmo.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/17-January-2025-PMs-LSE-Speech-The-Adaptive-Edge_Malaysias-Global-Strategy-in-an-Uncertain-Era.pdf

What Real Strategy Means: Malaysia's Active Choice and the Limits of Neutrality

Strategy is not the art of waiting until events become clear. It is forward-looking judgment made before outcomes are certain: choosing a principal direction, positioning early, committing resources and accepting opportunity costs. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s recent public positioning offers a revealing—but easily overstated—case. Malaysia can lean toward a principal strategic anchor on a defined issue while preserving secondary relationships and tactical flexibility. The assumption that neutrality alone delivers security and development deserves much closer scrutiny.

Strategy begins where reaction ends

Much of what passes for strategy is competent reaction. Governments adjust language after a crisis; companies reallocate capital after demand is proven. Such responses may be skillful, but consequence alone does not make them strategy.

Real strategy has five connected elements. It makes a forward judgment about shifts in power, technology, capital, geography and institutions. It positions before outside pressure removes the freedom to do so. It establishes a hierarchy between what is principal and what is secondary in a defined domain. It allocates diplomatic attention, capital, capability and credibility before the outcome is known. And it accepts opportunity cost: resources committed to one path cannot remain fully available to every other path.

This is what “choosing a side” should mean in serious analysis. It is not total submission, permanent loyalty or a rupture with every other partner. It is bounded, issue-specific and reviewable alignment: the selection of a principal strategic anchor for a stated purpose and period, with secondary relationships, safeguards and revision conditions left intact. Without those boundaries, alignment can become dependency. Without any hierarchy, diversification can become delay without a decision date.

The cost of permanent ambiguity

Neutrality, non-alignment and hedging have genuine strategic value. They can reduce exposure to conflict, widen the range of counterparties and preserve fallback options. Political scientist Cheng-Chwee Kuik defines hedging as “insurance-seeking behavior” under high uncertainty and high stakes: a state avoids rigid alignment while taking opposite-direction measures toward competing powers in order to maintain a fallback position.[1]

Insurance, however, is never free. Prolonged ambiguity can impose costs. Partners may withhold scarce technology, security commitments or market access from a country that never establishes priorities. Industrial policy may fail to cohere, and a crisis may eliminate optionality precisely when it is needed. If a country never absorbs a relationship cost, its commitments can also lose bargaining value. Kuik himself stresses that hedging “is not a panacea”; it carries risks of dependency, abandonment, entrapment and shrinking room for manoeuvre.[1]

The proposition here is therefore not that neutral or non-aligned countries are mistaken. Nor is it that every state must join a bloc. The proposition is narrower: neutrality cannot be treated as an independent cause of security and development. Security rests on capability, credible relationships and executable fallbacks. Development rests on productivity, access to markets and capital, human capability and institutional quality. Neutrality may support those foundations in some circumstances; it cannot substitute for them.

Anwar’s signal—and the limits of what it proves

In an Al Jazeera interview broadcast on 16 August 2026, Anwar said, “I see Taiwan as part of China, period.” When asked whether he would condemn a Chinese use of force, he answered through a hypothetical Malaysian secession scenario: “If one province decides to break away, do we use force? I think I will protect the sanctity and unity of the nation.” The interviewer followed: “So, you would use force?” Anwar replied, “Yes.”[2]

Evidence discipline matters here. The exact quotations are those words in the checked video exchange. The observed omission is that Anwar did not directly answer whether he would condemn China’s use of force. A reasonable inference is that his analogy was highly compatible with Beijing’s national-unity rationale and could be read as declining to condemn—or, within that particular frame, rationalising—the use of force. It is not accurate to say that he explicitly endorsed an invasion or approved any specific military operation. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs later said he had “publicly rationalized” China’s position on using force for unification; that is the Taiwanese government’s official interpretation and should be attributed as such, not substituted for the transcript.[3]

Nor did the interview create a policy from nothing. In the 1974 communiqué establishing diplomatic relations, Malaysia recognised the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and “acknowledge[d] the position of the Chinese Government” that Taiwan is an inalienable part of PRC territory.[4] A 2025 Malaysia–China joint statement used more categorical language: Malaysia reiterated its One China policy, stated that Taiwan is an inalienable territory of the PRC and said it would not support calls for Taiwan independence.[5] The 2026 interview sharpened the rhetoric of an existing policy; it did not constitute a new treaty, alliance, recognition decision or legal commitment.

Yet the exchange still had strategic significance. The reason is not that a sentence automatically purchases investment. There is no verified evidence of a quid pro quo, and 2025 investment approvals cannot be credited to an interview held in 2026. Its significance lies in the high-visibility signal: on an issue Beijing defines as a core interest, Anwar assigned unusually clear weight to Beijing’s narrative before an external event forced Malaysia to take a position. That is proactive positioning, even if the motives and eventual payoff remain unproven.

Economic structure makes the signal intelligible, not determinative. China was Malaysia’s largest trading partner for the seventeenth consecutive year in 2025, with bilateral trade of RM542.2 billion. The United States was Malaysia’s third-largest trading partner, at RM365.8 billion.[6] Of Malaysia’s approved foreign investment in 2025, Singapore accounted for RM58.3 billion, China RM58.0 billion and the United States RM15.1 billion; approved investment is not the same as realised capital.[7] These figures establish China’s structural weight. They do not demonstrate exclusivity, private intent or a material return caused by the interview.

A principal alignment with secondary flexibility

The broader record does not support the claim that Malaysia has comprehensively “chosen China.” Only about six weeks before the interview, Anwar described Malaysian foreign policy as “fiercely independent, proactive and non-aligned.” He said Malaysia takes “positions but not sides” and argued that force or coercion would compound resentment and unintended consequences.[8] The tension between that general rejection of force and his later secession analogy should be analysed rather than concealed. It may reflect a hierarchy between general doctrine and a sovereignty issue; it may also be rhetorical inconsistency. The available evidence does not establish motive.

Malaysia has simultaneously strengthened other consequential relationships. In October 2025, Malaysia and the United States elevated their ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership covering trade and investment, advanced technology, defence and security, energy security and regional stability.[9] Taiwan remained Malaysia’s fourth-largest trading partner in 2025, with RM233.02 billion in bilateral trade, much of it connected to electronics, semiconductor components, machinery and supply chains.[10] At the London School of Economics in January 2025, Anwar called robust ties with both China and the United States not a zero-sum choice but a “strategic imperative” for diversifying Malaysia’s economic base and reducing overdependence on a single partner.[11]

The best description is therefore more precise: Malaysia has made a bounded, issue-specific alignment with Beijing on the One China and national-unity narrative, nested inside a wider policy of hedging and strategic autonomy. It is a portfolio strategy. The principal alignment creates hierarchy on a defined question; secondary relationships diversify risk; clear legal and policy boundaries prevent the anchor relationship from becoming an external veto.

A principal direction need not point to the same partner in every domain. Malaysia can give China exceptional weight in trade and industrial networks, preserve US and other relationships in technology, capital and security, and maintain its own position on maritime rights. The 2025 Malaysia–China statement expanded cooperation in trade, investment, artificial intelligence, 5G, semiconductors, ports and energy, while also calling for South China Sea disputes to be handled peacefully under international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.[5] Strategic maturity lies in a clear hierarchy and credible boundaries, not a simple relationship map.

Risk is not a rebuttal; it is part of the strategy

Proactive choice does not abolish risk. It makes risk explicit enough to govern. Malaysia’s positioning faces at least five tests.

First is economic concentration. If exposure to Chinese demand, capital or industrial systems grows faster than Malaysia’s domestic capability, an anchor can become asymmetric leverage. Second is loss of manoeuvring room. If political signalling causes the United States, Taiwan or other partners to reduce technology access, investment or security cooperation, the secondary relationships may cease to function as insurance. Taiwan’s government has already warned that Anwar’s remarks could affect Taiwanese investor confidence. That is a concrete risk signal, not proof that investment will fall.[3]

Third is domestic legitimacy. A foreign-policy hierarchy must remain explainable to different regions, industries and communities at home; otherwise, external gains can be offset by internal distrust. Fourth is retaliation and entrapment. Clearer alignment can invite trade restrictions, technology controls or pressure to inherit a partner’s disputes. Fifth is forecast error. If anticipated shifts in growth, technology or power fail to materialise, early commitments become sunk costs.

These risks make the strategy falsifiable. If, over the next several years, Malaysia gains no relative improvement in industrial upgrading or market opportunity but materially loses technological access, investment diversity, South China Sea autonomy or domestic support, the positioning cannot be defended indefinitely as foresight. If, by contrast, Malaysia converts stronger China ties into productivity, talent and indigenous capability while preserving meaningful US, Taiwanese and other relationships and retaining maritime and diplomatic autonomy, bounded alignment will have passed a demanding strategic test.

A posture seeks coherence; a strategy specifies the outcomes, costs and revision points that determine whether it was right.

Six questions for political and business leaders

The lesson travels to the boardroom. Companies also preserve every option, postponing a technology architecture, core market or supply-chain commitment until uncertainty has vanished. The option set looks broad, but no capability compounds into advantage.

Before approving any plan described as strategic, a cabinet or board should answer six questions:

Principal on which issue? Not “Whose side are we on?” in the abstract, but which relationship or architecture has priority for a defined decision.

For what time horizon? Every alignment needs a review date.

Which resources move now? Capital, talent, capacity, diplomatic attention and credibility must be committed before certainty arrives.

What is the opportunity cost, and who bears it? If no cost is recorded, no real choice has been made.

Which secondary relationships and fallback options must remain viable? Resilience requires more than one route.

What observable conditions trigger acceleration, pause or reversal? A forecast without revision rules is conviction without governance.

Real strategy does not require certainty about the future. It requires disciplined commitment under uncertainty. It is different from passive reaction, but it is also different from treating balance as a permanent end in itself. The most instructive feature of Malaysia’s case is not that it has irrevocably selected one camp. It is that a state committed to strategic autonomy can still create a clear hierarchy on a specific core issue.

Neutrality can be a tool. Hedging can be insurance. Non-alignment can be a principle of autonomy. None of these labels automatically produces security or prosperity. Real strategy obliges leaders to decide—before history resolves the question—what is principal, which resources will be committed, what costs will be accepted and what evidence would prove the judgment wrong. Its purpose is not to eliminate uncertainty. It is to act ahead of uncertainty in a manner that is responsible, bounded, revisable and testable.

Notes and sources

• [1] Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Getting hedging right: a small-state perspective,” China International Strategy Review (2021): https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8608573/

• [2] Al Jazeera, “Anwar Ibrahim: Malaysia between the superpowers,” 16 August 2026 (relevant exchange approximately 16:11–19:00): https://www.aljazeera.com/video/the-india-report/2026/8/16/anwar-ibrahim-malaysia-between-the-superpowers ; video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ifKz9ZYSwo

• [3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), 18 August 2026: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&s=122919

• [4] Malaysia–PRC Joint Communiqué, 31 May 1974: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2732_663468/2733_663470/202406/t20240607_11410603.html

• [5] Malaysia–China Joint Statement, 17 April 2025: https://hk.ocmfa.gov.cn/eng/xjpzxzywshd/202504/t20250417_11595814.htm

• [6] Department of Statistics Malaysia, “External Trade Statistics, Malaysia, 2025”: https://www.dosm.gov.my/portal-main/release-content/external-trade-statistics-malaysia2025

• [7] Malaysian Investment Development Authority, 6 March 2026: https://www.mida.gov.my/media-release/malaysia-breaks-investment-record-with-rm426-7-billion-in-2025-up-11-year-on-year-creating-over-240000-new-jobs/

• [8] Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia, 39th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, 2 July 2026: https://www.pmo.gov.my/en/speeches-en/verbatim-text-yab-pm-question-and-answer-session-at-the-39th-asia-pacific-rountable-apr/

• [9] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Malaysia–United States Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, 26 October 2025: https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/-/malaysia-and-the-united-states-elevates-bilateral-relations-to-comprehensive-strategic-partnership

• [10] Taiwan International Trade Administration, Malaysia–Taiwan trade, 2025: https://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=45&pid=810540

• [11] Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia, “The Adaptive Edge: Malaysia’s Global Strategy in an Uncertain Era,” LSE, 17 January 2025: https://www.pmo.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/17-January-2025-PMs-LSE-Speech-The-Adaptive-Edge_Malaysias-Global-Strategy-in-an-Uncertain-Era.pdf