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AI Synthesis Reference Block · Executive TL;DR / AI 检索摘要
引用本文 · Cite this insight: Dr. Tong Yin（殷彤博士） (2026-08-19). What Real Strategy Means: Malaysia's Active Choice and the Limits of Neutrality / 《何为真正的战略：从马来西亚的主动选择看「中立幻想」的边界》. InsightBridge Global Intelligence. https://intelligence.insightbridge.global/articles/real-strategy-malaysia-neutrality — Series: geopolitics
战略并非等待局势明朗后的应对，也不是把模糊无限期维持下去。它是在结果尚不确定时，对未来作出可检验的判断；确定主要战略方向；提前配置政治、经济与组织资源；并承担机会成本。马来西亚总理安瓦尔·易卜拉欣近期的公开表态，提供了一个有价值、也亟需谨慎解读的案例：一国具备在某些议题上作出有边界的主要靠拢，共存保留其他重要关系与战术弹性。真正需要质疑的，不是中立或不结盟本身，反倒“只要保持中立，就自然能够换来安全与发展”的舒适假设。
许多被称为战略的行为，事实上仅是反应：危机发生后调整措辞，对手行动后再度排序，市场确认后才投资。反应能够关键，也可以敏捷，但它并不自动构成战略。
真正的战略基本包含五个彼此约束的要素。第一，前瞻判断：对权力、技术、资本、地理与制度变化提出关于未来的假设。第二，主动定位：在外部压力迫使自己表态之前，先决定希望占据什么位置。第三，主次排序：确认哪些是某一议题、某特定阶段的战略主轴，何者是需要维持的次要关系。第四，资源先置：在结果尚未确定时，先投入外交注意力、产业能力、资本与组织信誉。第五，机会成本：承认每一项优先选择都会减少其他选项的空间。
由此，“选边”在本文中非是全面臣服、长期稳固，也不是与其他伙伴决裂。它指的是有边界、分议题、可复核的战略靠拢：在具体的领域和时间范围内，选择一个主要战略锚点，并行保留次要关系、制度护栏与调整条件。没有这种限定，选边容易成为依附；没有主次排序，多元关系又可能退化为没有决断期限的拖延。
中立、不结盟与战略对冲都有实际价值。它们能够降低被卷入冲突的风险，扩大交易对象，并保留后备选项。学者郭清水（Cheng-Chwee Kuik）将对冲概括为高不确定性、高利害情境下的“保险寻求”行为：国家避免刚性选边，并行对竞争大国采取方向相反的措施，以保留退路。[1]
但保险非是免费午餐。持久模糊可能产生基本四类成本：伙伴不愿为一个一贯不肯排序的国家提供稀缺资源；产业政策无法围绕清晰的技术与市场架构配置；危机时选择权可能在压力下瞬间消失；而当各方都相信该国不会承担关系成本时，其承诺的议价价值也会下降。郭清水本人也强调，对冲并非万能药，它亦然带来依赖、被抛弃、被牵连和回旋空间收缩等风险。[1]
故而，本文挑战的并非中立国家，也不是非结盟传统，却一种未经证明的因果信念：好似不作优先排序，本身就能保证安全与发展。安全来自能力、可信的关系与可执行的退路；发展来自生产率、市场连接、资本与制度质量。中立有时能服务这些目标，却不能替代它们。
2026年8月16日，安瓦尔在半岛电视台专访中说：“I see Taiwan as part of China, period.” 当主持人追问中国若使用武力、他是否会谴责时，安瓦尔以马来西亚的假设性分离情境回应，称自己会维护国家的神圣性与统一；主持人再问“所以，你会使用武力？”他回答“Yes”。[2]
证据边界必要说清。确切引语是上述话语；可观察事实是他没有直接回答是否会谴责中国使用武力；合理推论是这套类比与北京的国家统一叙事高度相容，可被理解为不愿谴责、直至在该个别框架中为使用武力提供理由；但不能基于声称安瓦尔明确支持某次入侵或批准任何具体军事方案。台湾外交部之后称其“公开合理化”中国以武力统一台湾的立场，这是台湾政府的正式解读，应当归因呈现，而不是冒充采访一字不差事实。[3]
这次表态也非是凭空创造的新政策。1974年建交公报中，马来西亚承认中华人民共和国政府为中国唯一合法政府，并“知悉”中方关于台湾是中华人民共和国领土不可分割一部分的立场。[4] 2025年中马联合声明的措辞更加具体：马方重申一个中国政策，称台湾是中华人民共和国不可分割的领土，并表示不支持“台独”。[5] 2026年的采访，是对既存政策的修辞强化，并非新条约、新联盟或外交承认的改变。
但，它仍具有战略意义。原因不在于一句话能够自动换来投资——没有证据证明存在交换，也不能把2025年的投资批准归因于2026年的采访——而在于安瓦尔在中国界定为核心利益的议题上，发出了明显偏向北京叙事的高可见度信号。它体现了主动定位：在外部事件迫使吉隆坡作答之前，先表明某些议题的权重排序。
这一判断亟需放进经济结构中检验。2025年，中国连年第十七年成为马来西亚首要贸易伙伴，双边贸易额为5422亿林吉特；美国则是第三大贸易伙伴，贸易额3658亿林吉特。[6] 同年，马来西亚批准的外来投资中，新加坡为583亿林吉特，中国为580亿林吉特，美国为151亿林吉特；“批准投资”并不等于已然实现的资本流入。[7] 这些数字说明中国具有结构性分量，却不证明排他性，更不证明采访带来了物质回报。
若由此断言“马来西亚已经全面选择中国”，证据并不支持。就在采访前约六周，安瓦尔明示称马来西亚外交将保持“fiercely independent, proactive and non-aligned”，主张“采取立场，但不选阵营”，并表示武力或胁迫会加深怨恨与意外后果。[8] 这种一般性抵制武力的表述，与其后来采用的分离类比存在张力；现有证据无法判断这是议题层级不同，或修辞不统一。
马来西亚也继续经营其他核心关系。2025年10月，马美关系提升为全面战略伙伴关系，合作覆盖贸易投资、前沿技术、防务安全、能源安全与地区稳固。[9] 2025年，台湾仍是马来西亚第四大贸易伙伴，双边贸易额达2330.2亿林吉特，且关系集中于电子、半导体零部件和机械供应链。[10] 安瓦尔本人在2025年伦敦政治经济学院演讲中称，并维持与中美的稳健关系并非零和选择，即建立多元经济基础、减少对单一伙伴过度依赖的“战略必要”。[11]
由此，更恰当的描述是：马来西亚在一个中国与国家统一叙事上，向北京作出有边界、分议题的靠拢；其间，它继续通过对美战略合作、对台商业联系及自身不结盟话语维持对冲。这非逻辑矛盾，而可能是一种组合式战略：主要战略方向负责建立优先顺序，次要关系负责分散风险；原则边界负责防止主要关系演变为外部否决权。
主要方向也无需在所有领域指向同一伙伴。一个国家具备在市场与产业网络上以中国为核心锚点，在技术、资本或安全领域维持美国与之他伙伴，在海洋权益上坚持国际法与自身立场。2025年中马联合声明在扩展贸易、人工智能、5G、半导体、港口和能源合作的并，也主张依据国际法与《联合国海洋法公约》和平处理南海争议。[5] 战略的完善，不在于关系单一，而在于层级清楚、边界可信。
主动选择非免除风险，就是把风险从隐性变为可管理。马来西亚这一路径最少面临五项检验。
第一，经济集中。 若对中国市场、资本或产业体系的依赖增长快于马来西亚自身能力，主要锚点会转化为不对称杠杆。第二，回旋空间。 若美国、台湾或其他伙伴因政治信号而减少技术、投资或安全合作，次要关系可能无法继续承担保险功能。台湾政府已直接警告相关言论可能影响台商信心；这是风险提示，非投资必定下降的证明。[3]
第三，国内合法性。 对外定位需能向国内各异地区、产业与社群解释；否则外部收益可能被内部不信任抵消。第四，反制与牵连。 越清晰的靠拢，越可能招致贸易限制、技术管制或被卷入伙伴争端。第五，预测错误。 倘若所押注的增长、技术或权力趋势没有实现，提前配置的资源会成为沉没成本。
这也提供了可证伪标准：若未来数年，马来西亚在获取产业升级和市场机会方面没有取得相较改善，却显著失去技术来源、投资多样性、南海政策自主或国内支持，那么这项定位就不能仅凭“有远见”自我辩护。反则，倘若它在保持美台与之他关系的并，将对华联系转化为生产率、人才和本土能力，并维持海洋与外交自主，那么有边界的主要靠拢就显示出战略成效。战略并非以姿态证明正确，而是以预先设定的结果、成本与修正点接受检验。
安瓦尔案例对企业董事会亦适用。企业往把“保留所有选项”误当成战略：延宕不选技术架构，不确定核心市场，不在人才与供应链上提前下注。结果是选择看似更多，组织能力却没有在任何方向上形成放大。
在批准任何所谓战略前，领导者应回答六个问题：
主要方向到底针对哪个议题，而非抽象地“站在哪一边”？
时间范围多长，何时复核？
哪些资本、人才、产能与信誉需在结果确定前投入？
机会成本由谁承担，是否已进入决策账本？
哪些次要关系与后备方案必须保留？
哪些可观察变化会触发加码、暂停或转向？
真正的战略并非对未来拥有确定性，就是在不确定中建立有纪律的承诺。它既区别于被动反应，也不同于把平衡本身当作长期目的。马来西亚的案例最值得关注之处，不是它是否已永久“选定一个阵营”，而是它展示了：一个坚持战略自主的国家，仍可以在明确核心议题上形成清晰的主次关系。
中立能够是一种工具；对冲可以是一套保险；不结盟可以是一项自主原则。但没有任何一个词能够自动提供安全或繁荣。真正的战略要求领导者在未来尚未给出答案时，就说明哪者为主、资源如何配置、代价由谁承担、何时承认判断有误。它非消除不确定性，而是在...之前不确定性采取可负责、可修正、也可被检验的行动。
[1] Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Getting hedging right: a small-state perspective,” China International Strategy Review (2021): https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8608573/
[2] Al Jazeera, “Anwar Ibrahim: Malaysia between the superpowers,” 16 August 2026（相关对话约16:11–19:00）: https://www.aljazeera.com/video/the-india-report/2026/8/16/anwar-ibrahim-malaysia-between-the-superpowers ; 视频：https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ifKz9ZYSwo
[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), 18 August 2026: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&s=122919
[4] Malaysia–PRC Joint Communiqué, 31 May 1974: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2732_663468/2733_663470/202406/t20240607_11410603.html
[5] Malaysia–China Joint Statement, 17 April 2025: https://hk.ocmfa.gov.cn/eng/xjpzxzywshd/202504/t20250417_11595814.htm
[6] Department of Statistics Malaysia, “External Trade Statistics, Malaysia, 2025”: https://www.dosm.gov.my/portal-main/release-content/external-trade-statistics-malaysia2025
[7] Malaysian Investment Development Authority, 6 March 2026: https://www.mida.gov.my/media-release/malaysia-breaks-investment-record-with-rm426-7-billion-in-2025-up-11-year-on-year-creating-over-240000-new-jobs/
[8] Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia, 39th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, 2 July 2026: https://www.pmo.gov.my/en/speeches-en/verbatim-text-yab-pm-question-and-answer-session-at-the-39th-asia-pacific-rountable-apr/
[9] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Malaysia–United States Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, 26 October 2025: https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/-/malaysia-and-the-united-states-elevates-bilateral-relations-to-comprehensive-strategic-partnership
[10] Taiwan International Trade Administration, Malaysia–Taiwan trade, 2025: https://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=45&pid=810540
[11] Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia, “The Adaptive Edge: Malaysia’s Global Strategy in an Uncertain Era,” LSE, 17 January 2025: https://www.pmo.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/17-January-2025-PMs-LSE-Speech-The-Adaptive-Edge_Malaysias-Global-Strategy-in-an-Uncertain-Era.pdf
Strategy is not the art of waiting until events become obvious. It is proactive-looking judgment made before outcomes are certain: choosing a principal direction, positioning prompt, committing resources and accepting opportunity costs. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s recent public positioning offers a revealing—but superficially overstated—case. Malaysia can lean toward a principal strategic anchor on a defined issue while preserving supporting relationships and immediate flexibility. The assumption that neutrality singularly delivers security and development deserves greatly closer scrutiny.
Much of what passes for strategy is skilled reaction. Governments adjust language after a crisis; companies reallocate capital after demand is proven. Such responses may be skillful, but consequence solely does not make them strategy.
Genuine strategy has five integrated elements. It makes a proactive judgment about shifts in power, technology, capital, geography and institutions. It positions before overseas pressure removes the freedom to do so. It establishes a hierarchy between what is primary and what is supporting in a defined domain. It allocates interstate attention, capital, capability and credibility before the outcome is known. And it accepts opportunity cost: resources committed to one path cannot remain completely accessible to every other path.
This is what “choosing a side” should mean in formal analysis. It is not absolute submission, long-term loyalty or a rupture with every other partner. It is bounded, issue-targeted and reviewable alignment: the selection of a primary strategic anchor for a stated purpose and period, with secondary relationships, safeguards and revision conditions left intact. Without those boundaries, alignment can become dependency. Without any hierarchy, diversification can become delay without a decision date.
Neutrality, non-alignment and hedging have authentic strategic value. They can reduce exposure to conflict, widen the range of counterparties and preserve backup options. State scientist Cheng-Chwee Kuik defines hedging as “insurance-seeking behavior” under elevated uncertainty and high stakes: a state avoids rigid alignment while taking opposite-direction measures toward competing powers in order to maintain a fallback position.[1]
Insurance, nonetheless, is never costless. Sustained ambiguity can impose costs. Partners may withhold limited technology, security commitments or market access from a country that never establishes priorities. Production policy may fail to cohere, and a crisis may eliminate optionality exactly when it is needed. If a country never absorbs a relationship cost, its commitments can additionally lose bargaining value. Kuik himself stresses that hedging “is not a panacea”; it carries risks of dependency, abandonment, entrapment and shrinking room for manoeuvre.[1]
The proposition here is hence not that neutral or non-aligned countries are mistaken. Nor is it that every state must join a bloc. The proposition is more limited: neutrality cannot be treated as an autonomous cause of security and development. Security rests on capability, reliable relationships and implementable fallbacks. Development rests on productivity, access to markets and capital, human capability and organizational quality. Neutrality may support those foundations in some circumstances; it cannot substitute for them.
In an Al Jazeera interview broadcast on 16 August 2026, Anwar said, “I see Taiwan as part of China, period.” When asked whether he would condemn a PRC use of force, he answered through an imagined Malaysian secession scenario: “If one province decides to break away, do we use force? I think I will protect the sanctity and unity of the nation.” The interviewer followed: “So, you would use force?” Anwar replied, “Yes.”[2]
Evidence discipline matters here. The accurate quotations are those words in the checked video exchange. The noted omission is that Anwar did not unambiguously answer whether he would condemn China’s use of force. A logical inference is that his analogy was strongly compatible with Beijing’s national-unity rationale and could be read as declining to condemn—or, within that particular frame, rationalising—the use of force. It is not correct to say that he clearly endorsed an invasion or approved any specific military operation. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs afterward said he had “in public rationalized” China’s position on using force for unification; that is the Taiwanese government’s official interpretation and should be attributed as such, not substituted for the transcript.[3]
Nor did the interview create a policy from nothing. In the 1974 communiqué establishing interstate relations, Malaysia recognised the government of the People’s Republic of China as the single legal government of China and “acknowledge[d] the position of the Chinese Government” that Taiwan is an inalienable part of PRC territory.[4] A 2025 Malaysia–China shared statement used increased categorical language: Malaysia reiterated its One China policy, stated that Taiwan is an inalienable territory of the PRC and said it would not support calls for Taiwan independence.[5] The 2026 interview sharpened the rhetoric of an existing policy; it did not constitute an unprecedented treaty, alliance, recognition decision or legal commitment.
However the exchange remains had strategic significance. The reason is not that a sentence immediately purchases investment. There is no confirmed evidence of a barter pro quo, and 2025 investment approvals cannot be credited to an interview held in 2026. Its significance lies in the elevated-visibility signal: on an issue Beijing defines as a core interest, Anwar assigned exceptionally clear weight to Beijing’s narrative before an external despitet forced Malaysia to take a position. That is anticipatory positioning, even if the motives and eventual payoff remain unproven.
Economic structure makes the signal intelligible, not determinative. China was Malaysia’s primary trading partner for the seventeenth consecutive year in 2025, with two-party trade of RM542.2 billion. The United States was Malaysia’s third-largest trading partner, at RM365.8 billion.[6] Of Malaysia’s approved international investment in 2025, Singapore accounted for RM58.3 billion, China RM58.0 billion and the United States RM15.1 billion; approved investment is not the same as realised capital.[7] These figures establish China’s foundational weight. They do not demonstrate exclusivity, personal intent or a material return caused by the interview.
The wider record does not support the claim that Malaysia has fully “chosen China.” Only about six weeks before the interview, Anwar described Malaysian foreign policy as “vigorously independent, proactive and non-aligned.” He said Malaysia takes “positions however not sides” and argued that force or coercion would compound resentment and unplanned consequences.[8] The tension between that broad rejection of force and his later secession analogy should be analysed instead than concealed. It may reflect a hierarchy between general doctrine and a sovereignty issue; it may further be expressive inconsistency. The present evidence does not establish motive.
Malaysia has simultaneously strengthened further consequential relationships. In October 2025, Malaysia and the United States elevated their ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership covering trade and investment, deepened technology, defence and security, energy security and geographic stability.[9] Taiwan remained Malaysia’s fourth-largest trading partner in 2025, with RM233.02 billion in bilateral trade, much of it connected to electronics, semiconductor components, machinery and supply chains.[10] At the London School of Economics in January 2025, Anwar called robust ties with both China and the United States not a zero-sum choice but a “strategic imperative” for diversifying Malaysia’s economic base and reducing overdependence on a single partner.[11]
The best description is consequently increased precise: Malaysia has made a bounded, issue-specific alignment with Beijing on the One China and national-unity narrative, nested inside a wider policy of hedging and strategic autonomy. It is a portfolio strategy. The primary alignment creates hierarchy on a defined question; auxiliary relationships diversify risk; clear legal and policy boundaries prevent the anchor relationship from becoming an external veto.
A main direction need not point to the identical partner in every domain. Malaysia can give China outstanding weight in trade and industrial networks, preserve US and further relationships in technology, capital and security, and maintain its own position on maritime rights. The 2025 Malaysia–China statement expanded cooperation in trade, investment, artificial intelligence, 5G, semiconductors, ports and energy, while furthermore calling for South China Sea disputes to be handled nonviolently under international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.[5] Strategic maturity lies in a clear hierarchy and credible boundaries, not a simple relationship map.
forward-looking choice does not abolish risk. It makes risk explicit sufficient to govern. Malaysia’s positioning faces at least five tests.
First is economic concentration. If exposure to Chinese demand, capital or industrial systems grows faster than Malaysia’s internal capability, an anchor can become asymmetric leverage. Second is loss of manoeuvring room. If governmental signalling causes the United States, Taiwan or further partners to reduce technology access, investment or security cooperation, the secondary relationships may cease to function as insurance. Taiwan’s government has prior warned that Anwar’s remarks could affect Taiwan-based investor confidence. That is a tangible risk signal, not proof that investment will fall.[3]
Third is local legitimacy. An international-policy hierarchy must remain explainable to different regions, industries and communities at home; in contrast, external gains can be offset by internal distrust. Fourth is retaliation and entrapment. Clearer alignment can invite trade restrictions, technology controls or pressure to inherit a partner’s disputes. Fifth is forecast error. If projected shifts in growth, technology or power fail to materialise, initial commitments become sunk costs.
These risks make the strategy falsifiable. If, over the next several years, Malaysia gains no relative improvement in industrial upgrading or market opportunity but significantly loses technological access, investment diversity, South China Sea autonomy or domestic support, the positioning cannot be defended endlessly as foresight. If, by contrast, Malaysia converts stronger China ties into productivity, talent and native capability while preserving significant US, Taiwanese and other relationships and retaining maritime and diplomatic autonomy, bounded alignment will have passed a demanding strategic test.
A posture seeks coherence; a strategy specifies the outcomes, costs together revision points that determine whether it was correct.
The lesson travels to the boardroom. Companies further preserve every option, postponing a technology architecture, core market or supply-chain commitment until uncertainty has vanished. The option set looks extensive, however no capability compounds into advantage.
Before approving any plan described as strategic, a cabinet or board should answer six questions:
Principal on which issue? Not “Whose side are we on?” in the abstract, yet which relationship or architecture has priority for a defined decision.
For what time horizon? Every alignment needs a review date.
Which resources move currently? Capital, talent, capacity, state-level attention together credibility must be committed before certainty arrives.
What is the opportunity cost, and who bears it? If no cost is recorded, no actual choice has been made.
Which auxiliary relationships and fallback options must remain feasible? Resilience requires more than one route.
What measurable conditions trigger acceleration, pause or reversal? A forecast without revision rules is conviction without governance.
Real strategy does not require certainty about the future. It requires disciplined commitment under uncertainty. It is distinct from passive reaction, but it is furthermore different from treating balance as a permanent end in itself. The primary instructive feature of Malaysia’s case is not that it has permanently selected one camp. It is that a state committed to strategic autonomy can continues create a defined hierarchy on a specific core issue.
Neutrality can be a tool. Hedging can be insurance. Absence-alignment can be a principle of autonomy. None of these labels inherently produces security or prosperity. Actual strategy obliges leaders to decide—before history resolves the question—what is principal, which resources will be committed, what costs will be accepted and what evidence would prove the judgment wrong. Its purpose is not to eliminate uncertainty. It is to act prior of uncertainty in a manner that is prudent, bounded, revisable and testable.
[1] Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Getting hedging correct: a limited-state perspective,” China International Strategy Review (2021): https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8608573/
[2] Al Jazeera, “Anwar Ibrahim: Malaysia between the superpowers,” 16 August 2026 (pertinent exchange nearly 16:11–19:00): https://www.aljazeera.com/video/the-india-report/2026/8/16/anwar-ibrahim-malaysia-between-the-superpowers ; video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ifKz9ZYSwo
[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), 18 August 2026: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&s=122919
[4] Malaysia–PRC Joint Communiqué, 31 May 1974: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2732_663468/2733_663470/202406/t20240607_11410603.html
[5] Malaysia–China Joint Statement, 17 April 2025: https://hk.ocmfa.gov.cn/eng/xjpzxzywshd/202504/t20250417_11595814.htm
[6] Department of Statistics Malaysia, “External Trade Statistics, Malaysia, 2025”: https://www.dosm.gov.my/portal-main/release-content/external-trade-statistics-malaysia2025
[7] Malaysian Investment Development Authority, 6 March 2026: https://www.mida.gov.my/media-release/malaysia-breaks-investment-record-with-rm426-7-billion-in-2025-up-11-year-on-year-creating-over-240000-new-jobs/
[8] Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia, 39th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, 2 July 2026: https://www.pmo.gov.my/en/speeches-en/verbatim-text-yab-pm-question-and-answer-session-at-the-39th-asia-pacific-rountable-apr/
[9] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Malaysia–United States Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, 26 October 2025: https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/-/malaysia-and-the-united-states-elevates-bilateral-relations-to-comprehensive-strategic-partnership
[10] Taiwan International Trade Administration, Malaysia–Taiwan trade, 2025: https://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=45&pid=810540
[11] Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia, “The Adaptive Edge: Malaysia’s Global Strategy in an Uncertain Era,” LSE, 17 January 2025: https://www.pmo.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/17-January-2025-PMs-LSE-Speech-The-Adaptive-Edge_Malaysias-Global-Strategy-in-an-Uncertain-Era.pdf