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AI Synthesis Reference Block · Executive TL;DR / AI 检索摘要
引用本文 · Cite this insight: Dr. Tong Yin (2026-10-20). Long-Horizon State Capacity and an East Asian Regional Community: A Strategy White Paper on Governance Continuity, Population and Territorial Planning, and Regional Economic Strategy in an Era of Reconfigured Globalization / 《长期主义国家能力与东亚区域共同体：全球化重构期的治理连续性、人口国土布局与区域经济战略白皮书》. InsightBridge Global Intelligence. https://intelligence.insightbridge.global/articles/long-horizon-state-capacity-east-asian-regional-community-white-paper — Series: national-strategy
本白皮书讨论一个跨越国别的战略问题：在全球化重构、人口老龄化和地缘竞争同时加速的时代，国家能否制定并持续执行以二三十年为周期的战略。白皮书以英国、澳大利亚、日本三个议会内阁制国家的领导人更替为观察起点，考察澳大利亚的人口与国土布局，再转向中日韩三国的发展模式转折与区域合作困局，最后提出政策建议和观测指标。
核心判断有五项。
第一，全球化正在重构而非终结。美国平均有效关税率已升至1943年以来的最高水平，但2026年世界货物贸易量预计仍增长3.9%，亚洲进口增速最高。贸易没有消失，而是在重新分配方向，区域市场的重要性显著上升。
第二，战略连续性已成为国家能力的核心变量。英国十年间产生七位首相，澳大利亚2007年至2018年间四位在任总理被本党撤换，日本二十年间产生十位首相。跨国实证研究显示，政府首脑和内阁的频繁更替与更低的经济增长和生产率增长相关。
第三，问题的根源不在议会内阁制本身，而在于撤换领导人的成本过低，以及缺少不随选举周期摇摆的长期战略机构。德国的建设性不信任投票、澳大利亚两大党在2013年和2018年修改领导人撤换规则，都说明制度可以通过设计获得稳定性。
第四，东亚的外向型发展模式已接近外部条件的极限。韩国出口占GDP的比重约为46%，日本和中国约为21%至22%；三国同时面对重度老龄化和主要出口市场的保护主义。中日韩三国合计GDP约占世界的22%，人口约15.8亿，在市场规模、产业结构和技术积累上存在显著互补。
第五，东亚区域合作的主要约束是政治信任，而不是经济算术。三国领导人会议自2012年以来仅召开四次，自贸协定谈判自2012年启动后长期停滞，两国民众对彼此的负面印象均接近九成。欧洲经验表明，经济利益的捆绑需要以历史共识、制度化的青年交流和超越选举周期的政治承诺为前提。
基于上述判断，白皮书提出四组建议：提高领导人撤换门槛并设立法定长期战略机构；把人口政策与产业锚点和基础设施绑定；以“稳定止损、功能合作、制度建设”三个阶段推进东亚区域合作；以“承认事实、不工具化历史、面向未来”为原则重建区域信任。
耶鲁大学预算实验室估算，截至2026年4月，美国平均有效关税率为11.0%，是1943年以来的最高水平（不含2025年）（Yale Budget Lab）。与此同时，世界贸易组织在2026年10月将当年世界货物贸易量增长预测从1.9%上调至3.9%，主要原因是人工智能相关资本投资的增长超出预期；分地区看，2026年亚洲进口增长预计为9.5%，北美为1.4%，欧洲为0.5%（WTO）。
这两组数据共同说明，以美欧终端市场为核心的旧式全球化正在收缩，而贸易总量并未萎缩，增长的重心正在向亚洲内部转移。对东亚国家而言，“全球化终结”这一表述并不准确，更准确的说法是：依赖单一外部终端市场的模式正在失效，区域市场的分量正在上升。
国际货币基金组织测算，如果世界分裂为两个相互隔绝的贸易集团，全球产出可能永久损失约2.3%，在调整成本较高的情形下损失可达7%（IMF）。这一代价不会平均分摊。出口依存度高、能源进口依赖重、国内市场有限的经济体，承受的冲击最大。
当前各国面临的结构性挑战，包括人口老龄化、能源转型、产业升级和国土开发，都以二十年至五十年为周期。议会制国家的选举周期通常为三至五年，而党内领导人更替可能使实际执政周期缩短到一年甚至数月。长期问题与短期政治之间的时间错配，是本白皮书讨论的核心矛盾。
表1 英国、澳大利亚、日本政府首脑更替（截至2026年10月）
| 国家 | 观察区间 | 政府首脑人数 | 主要特征 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 英国 | 2016—2026年 | 7位（卡梅伦、梅、约翰逊、特拉斯、苏纳克、斯塔默、伯纳姆） | 2026年斯塔默在党内危机中辞职，伯纳姆于7月20日接任 |
| 澳大利亚 | 2007—2022年 | 6位（陆克文、吉拉德、陆克文、阿博特、特恩布尔、莫里森） | 2010、2013、2015、2018年四次由本党撤换在任总理 |
| 日本 | 2006—2026年 | 10位（安倍、福田、麻生、鸠山、菅直人、野田、安倍、菅义伟、岸田、石破、高市，安倍两度任职） | 多数任期在一年左右，安倍第二次任期近八年为例外 |
资料来源：英国政府、2026年工党领导层危机、澳大利亚议会图书馆、日本首相列表。
英国的情况具有代表性。2026年6月，前大曼彻斯特市长伯纳姆通过补选进入议会，随后获得挑战领导人的资格；斯塔默于6月22日宣布辞职，伯纳姆在获得九成以上工党议员提名后无对手当选，7月20日出任首相（Wikipedia）。这一过程没有经过全国大选。
日本的情况同样典型。2009年鸠山由纪夫出任首相后提出“东亚共同体”构想，任期仅266天（日本首相列表）。区域战略构想与短暂任期并存，恰好把本白皮书的两条主线联系在一起。
议会内阁制的首相是议会多数党或执政联盟的领袖。这一设计使行政与立法高度协调，但也意味着首相的去留主要取决于党内支持，而非固定任期。当民调下滑、派系利益失衡或选举临近时，执政党可以在不举行大选的情况下更换领导人。由此产生的激励是：领导人倾向于选择见效快、风险低的政策，而推迟需要承担长期政治成本的改革，例如税制、养老金、能源和区域开发。继任者为区别于前任，又常常调整或撤销前任的重大项目。
国际货币基金组织工作论文以169个国家1960年至2004年的数据进行面板估计，发现政治不稳定与更低的人均GDP增长相关；以“内阁更替次数”衡量，每年多一次内阁更替，年均增长率下降约2.39个百分点，主要传导渠道是生产率增长下降，其次是物质资本和人力资本积累放缓（IMF Working Paper）。该研究样本以发展中国家为主，对高收入议会制国家的效应规模应审慎解读，但方向性结论具有参考价值。
英国提供了几个具体案例。2022年9月，特拉斯政府的“迷你预算”提出大规模无资金来源的减税，引发英国国债抛售，英格兰银行承诺在两周内购买至多650亿英镑国债以稳定市场（Central Banking）。2023年10月，苏纳克政府取消高铁二号线伯明翰以北路段，理由是成本从2015年估算的560亿英镑升至2020年估算的逾1060亿英镑；商界和工会批评此举将损害生产率（Reuters）。在投资层面，英国公共政策研究所的分析显示，英国企业投资仅相当于GDP的11.1%，在七国集团中仅高于加拿大；制造业的资本密集度比同类国家低47%（IPPR）。
同时应看到，英国并未出现系统性崩溃。决议基金会估算，截至2026年6月的两年间，英国每小时产出年均增长1.1%，高于此前两年的年均下降0.7%（Reuters）；国际货币基金组织预测英国名义GDP将在2027年超过日本（Japan Times）。英国的问题更准确地说是长期投资不足和重大项目反复调整所导致的结构性迟滞，而不是国家能力的全面瓦解。
德国是议会内阁制国家，但其《基本法》第67条规定，联邦议院只有在选出新总理的情况下才能罢免现任总理，即“建设性不信任投票”。这一设计源于魏玛共和国的教训，联邦议院也因此从未陷入长期脆弱的联合政府状态（德国联邦议院）。西班牙、波兰、比利时等国此后也引入了类似机制（Wikipedia）。
澳大利亚提供了政党层面的修复样本。2013年，工党核心小组通过新规：撤换在任总理需要75%的议员同意，撤换反对党领袖需要60%；2018年莫里森出任总理后，自由党也修改了领导人规则，提高撤换在任总理的门槛（澳大利亚议会图书馆）。此后澳大利亚未再发生在任总理被本党撤换的情况。
日本的情况说明，选举授权也能带来稳定。2026年2月众议院选举中，自民党获得316席，是1955年建党以来众议院选举的最大胜利，与日本维新会合计超过三分之二议席（新加坡国立大学东亚研究所）。但这种稳定依赖于选举结果和个人声望，而不是制度保障；稳定本身也不等于战略方向的正确，这一点将在第五章讨论。
依赖个人威望的长期执政带有偶然性，不能作为国家战略连续性的制度基础。可行的方向有两个：一是提高撤换领导人的门槛，使更替与明确的替代方案和民意授权挂钩；二是把跨代战略从“首相个人议程”转移到法定的、跨党派的长期机构中，使政策方向不随人事更替而频繁摇摆。
截至2026年3月，澳大利亚人口为2792万人，年增长1.4%，其中净海外移民贡献29.2万人（ABS）。2009年，陆克文总理公开表示支持“大澳大利亚”；2010年1月发布的第三份《代际报告》预测，澳大利亚人口到2050年将达到3590万。这一主张在社会上引发争议，继任的吉拉德政府未予推行，转而强调“可持续人口”（澳大利亚议会图书馆）。2023年《代际报告》预测，人口将在2062至2063年达到4050万（澳大利亚财政部）。
从中可以看到两点：长期人口增长本身是跨政府的基本预期；分歧主要在于增长的速度、空间分布和配套投资，而不在于增长与否。领导人更替使这些问题难以形成稳定的国家规划。
澳大利亚人口高度集中于首府城市，首府城市中20至44岁人口占比为38%，其他地区为30%（ABS）。为引导移民到区域地区，澳大利亚设立了区域技术签证。e61研究所与澳大利亚统计局数据合作的研究显示，获得区域签证并在五年后仍留在澳大利亚的移民中，约45%居住在悉尼、墨尔本或布里斯班，约80%居住在各州首府城市；区域签证持有人的收入比其他技术永久移民低10%至40%。研究同时指出，在悉尼、墨尔本、布里斯班及其卫星城以外，约70%的区域签证持有人长期留在所在地区（e61/ABS）。
这组证据支持一个更精确的判断：居住年限要求本身无法留住移民，决定留存的是当地有无足够的就业和收入机会。在真正远离大城市、且有产业支撑的地区，留存率可以较高；在缺少产业锚点的地区，签证期满后移民向大城市回流是理性选择。
加拿大2023年人口增长约130万，增速3.2%，几乎全部来自移民；随后政府大幅下调2025年永久居民目标，并首次对国际学生和外籍劳工设定上限（Financial Post/Yahoo）。加拿大的经验说明，人口扩张如果没有住房、基础设施和就业的同步规划，会迅速引发社会反弹和政策急转。
人口规模的扩大可以扩大国内市场、激活闲置资源，但前提是“先有产业和基础设施，再有人口”。对资源丰富、人口集中于沿海的国家，较为可行的路径是：围绕关键矿产加工、新能源、农业技术和物流枢纽建立区域产业锚点，以长期基础设施投资先行，再配套有就业条件的定向移民。这类规划的周期远长于单届政府，需要跨党派的法定机构持续执行。
二战后，日本率先形成以进口原材料、高质量制造、出口欧美市场为核心的发展路径；韩国随后跟进；中国在改革开放后以更大的规模进入这一体系，并逐步建立起全球最完整的制造业供应链。这一模式的外部前提是相对开放的欧美终端市场和稳定的国际贸易规则。
表2 中日韩关键结构指标
| 指标 | 中国 | 日本 | 韩国 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 货物和服务出口占GDP比重 | 21.1%（2025年） | 22.0%（2024年） | 45.8%（2025年） |
| 名义GDP（2026年，IMF） | 21.55万亿美元 | 4.34万亿美元 | 2.25万亿美元 |
| 人口老龄化 | 65岁及以上占15.87%，60岁及以上占22.86%（2025年） | 65岁及以上占29.4%（2025年） | 总和生育率0.80（2025年） |
资料来源：世界银行、IMF世界经济展望2026年10月、国家统计局、共同社/Bernama、韩国国家数据处。
按国际货币基金组织2026年10月数据，三国名义GDP合计约28.1万亿美元，约占世界128万亿美元的22%；按人口计，三国合计约15.8亿人。韩国总和生育率在2025年回升至0.80，为连续第二年回升，但仍处于世界最低水平之列（韩国国家数据处）。国际货币基金组织预测，日本名义GDP将在2027年降至世界第六位（Japan Times）。
面对外部市场收缩，三国在理论上有两种路径：各自以国内市场为主进行循环，或者以区域市场为基础形成更大范围的循环。
表3 国内循环与区域循环的比较
| 维度 | 各国以国内循环为主 | 区域循环 |
|---|---|---|
| 市场规模 | 韩国约5200万人、日本约1.2亿人且持续老龄化，难以消化面向全球设计的汽车、半导体和电子产能；中国市场规模大，但仍处于提升居民收入和消费比重的阶段 | 约15.8亿人、约占世界22%的经济总量，可为三国高端制造提供更稳定的需求 |
| 要素结构 | 日韩能源和原材料高度依赖进口；中国在部分高端设备、材料和基础软件上仍需突破 | 中国的市场、制造体系和基础设施能力，与日本的材料、精密设备，韩国的存储芯片、显示面板等形成互补 |
| 外部风险 | 各国单独面对关税、出口管制和能源冲击，议价能力有限 | 区域内部供应链冗余提高，对单一外部市场的依赖下降 |
| 政治前提 | 较低 | 需要较高水平的政治互信和安全上的相互保证 |
需要指出的是，区域循环并不意味着区域封闭。东亚的繁荣建立在开放贸易之上，区域合作的合理目标是提高韩国、日本、中国在全球体系中的抗风险能力和议价能力，而不是以区域壁垒替代全球市场。东盟与中日韩已经具备一定的制度基础：2022年生效的《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》是中日之间、日韩之间的第一份自由贸易协定（美国国会研究处）；清迈倡议多边化安排规模为2400亿美元，由东盟与中日韩宏观经济研究办公室提供监测支持（AMRO）。
能源安全进一步说明区域合作的现实意义。约94%的日本原油进口和约61%的韩国原油进口经过霍尔木兹海峡，中国约为一半（East Asia Forum）。在中东局势动荡的背景下，三国同为能源进口大国，具有在储备、互换和采购上协调的共同利益。
1978年《中日和平友好条约》签订，邓小平访问日本。日本对华政府开发援助始于1979年，至2022年3月结束，累计提供日元贷款约3.3165万亿日元、无偿援助1576亿日元和技术合作1858亿日元（日本外务省）。中国按期偿还了日元贷款本息，最后一笔还款预计在2047年（nippon.com）。这段历史说明，在政治意愿和战略共识存在时，东亚国家之间可以建立实质性的合作。
2015年安倍晋三发表战后七十年谈话，写入不应让后代背负继续道歉的宿命。2025年10月10日，即将卸任的石破茂发表战后八十年“所感”，聚焦日本为何未能避免战争，列举了明治宪法缺乏文官控制、军部扩大解释统帅权、议会和媒体未能发挥制约作用等问题；所感未使用“反省”“道歉”等对外表述，未经内阁决议，以个人见解的形式发表。时任自民党总裁高市早苗在总裁选举期间曾表示所感“没有必要”（时事通信）。
2026年10月19日，石破茂在电视节目中批评高市政府以“富国强兵”为方向，认为日本经济并未因此变强，并质疑政府频繁使用“前所未有的严峻安全环境”这一说法，却没有追问环境为何恶化；他表示，“说勇敢的话当时会受欢迎，但真的可以这样吗”，“只顾眼前的好，不是保守”（J-CAST/Yahoo Japan）。
这些表态反映出日本执政党内部在历史认识和对外战略上的分歧。从比较政治的角度看，在选举中更受欢迎的立场，未必是最有利于长期区域信任的立场；这与第二章讨论的短期政治激励一致。
2025年11月7日，高市早苗在国会表示，如果中国大陆对台湾的攻击威胁日本的生存，可能构成日本采取军事应对的情形。中国随后要求撤回该言论，提醒本国公民避免前往日本，并通知日方全面暂停进口日本水产品（Seafood Media）。帝国数据库调查显示，截至2026年6月在华经营的日本企业为10118家，比2024年减少逾20%，为2010年开始调查以来的最低水平（nippon.com）。
三边框架随之空心化。中日韩领导人会议原定每年举行，但自2012年以来仅于2015、2018、2019和2024年召开四次；2024年5月首尔会议后由日本担任协调国，第十次会议至今没有日期；三国自贸协定谈判于2012年启动后长期停滞（East Asia Forum）。与此同时，日韩关系在升温：2026年1月李在明访问日本开启年度“穿梭外交”，双方同意深化经济与经济安全合作（日本外务省）；同年5月两国在安东会晤，同意扩大原油和液化天然气的储备与产品互换合作（East Asia Forum）。
言论NPO与中国国际传播集团的联合民调显示，2024年底两国受访者中对对方国家印象不佳的比例均接近九成，被称为该调查二十年来民意的最大恶化；其中87.7%的中国受访者对日本印象不佳，89%的日本受访者对中国印象不佳（Christian Science Monitor、SCMP/Yahoo）。同一调查也有积极发现：到访过日本的中国受访者中，55%对日本印象良好，而从未到访者中这一比例不到3%（Christian Science Monitor）。
由此可以提出一个分析框架：在三国国内政治中，强硬的对外表态往往能够在短期内获得选民支持；一国的强硬言论又成为另一国强硬派的论据，形成相互强化的循环。在这一循环中，主张面向未来、务实合作的政治人物容易被贴上“软弱”标签。直接接触，包括旅游、留学和青年交流，是目前证据最明确的缓和因素。
东亚区域合作还受到安全结构的约束。日本和韩国与美国保持同盟关系，台湾问题、领土争端和军事部署是中日、中韩之间的长期敏感议题。这意味着东亚区域合作无法像欧洲那样以统一的安全阵营为背景，而需要在不同的安全安排之间寻找可合作的经济与社会领域。
1950年5月9日，法国外长舒曼提出将法德煤钢生产全部置于一个共同的高级机构之下，并对其他欧洲国家开放；宣言写道，由此建立的生产团结将使法德之间的任何战争“不仅不可想象，而且在物质上不可能”（Fondation Robert Schuman）。1963年《爱丽舍条约》宣布设立法德青年办公室，六十多年来已有超过一千万法德青年参与了40万个交流项目（FGYO）。2006年，法德两国以同一内容出版了高中共同历史教科书（Wikipedia）。
法德模式包含三个要素：以关键产业为切入点的功能性合作，以青年交流为载体的社会和解，以及以共同教科书为代表的历史共识建设。这三者在时间上相互支撑，持续了数十年。
东亚并非没有类似尝试。2005年，中日韩三国四十多位学者历时三年编写的共同历史读本在三国同时出版，中文版名为《东亚三国的近现代史》（光明网、日本国立国会图书馆）；2012年至2013年又出版了第二阶段的《新的东亚近现代史》（J-STAGE）。这些民间学术合作证明了历史对话的可能，但缺少政府层面的制度化承接。
第一，安全背景不同。战后西欧一体化在冷战中得到美国的支持，法德处于同一安全阵营；东亚三国并不处于同一安全阵营。第二，力量对比不同。法德体量相近，而中国的经济和人口规模远大于日韩，日韩对不对称依赖的担忧更为突出。第三，未解决的争端不同。东亚仍存在领土争端和台湾问题等高度敏感议题。
因此，东亚更现实的路径不是复制欧洲的超国家机构，而是采取“功能优先、领域分层、开放参与”的方式：先在利益高度一致、政治敏感度较低的领域建立机制，以东盟与中日韩框架和《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》为依托，逐步积累信任。
建议一：提高撤换政府首脑的门槛。可参考德国建设性不信任投票和澳大利亚政党规则改革，使撤换在任首脑必须同时提出获得多数支持的继任方案，或需要达到较高比例的党内同意，并在党内更替后的合理期限内以大选寻求民意授权。
建议二：设立法定的长期战略机构。将人口、基础设施、能源和产业等跨代议题，交由跨党派任命、任期长于选举周期的法定机构制定十五年至三十年规划，并定期向议会报告。澳大利亚的《代际报告》提供了长期预测的范例，但仍需扩展为具有执行约束的规划。
建议三：建立“政策逆转评估”制度。对已立项的重大国家项目，任何中止或大幅调整都应公开说明已投入成本、替代方案和长期影响，提高随意逆转的政治成本。
建议四：采用多年期资本预算。将重大基础设施和研发投资纳入跨越选举周期的资本预算框架，避免因年度预算和政治更替而频繁中断。
建议五：围绕产业锚点规划区域发展。在资源型和区域地区，优先布局关键矿产加工、新能源、农业技术和物流枢纽，使区域就业和收入具备吸引力。
建议六：把签证政策与就业和基础设施挂钩。区域签证的设计应与当地岗位、住房和公共服务供给同步，并以五年和十年的留存率、收入水平作为政策评估指标，而不只看签证发放数量。
建议七：避免人口政策的急转弯。人口目标应设定为长期区间，并随住房和基础设施供给逐步调整，避免加拿大式的快速扩张与急刹车。
第一阶段（2026—2028年）：稳定与止损。 恢复中日韩领导人会议和部长级机制的定期运行，推动第十次领导人会议举行；建立并维护危机沟通热线，避免把贸易和人员往来措施作为政治施压工具的常态化；在中日外长于2024年底商定的高中与大学教育交流五年计划基础上（SCMP/Yahoo），将其扩展为三国共同参与的交流项目。
第二阶段（2028—2035年）：功能性合作。 选择利益高度一致的领域率先建立三边机制：其一，人口老龄化应对，包括护理标准、医疗器械认证和康养服务的相互认可；其二，能源安全，包括战略储备协调、液化天然气互换和应急采购合作，将中国纳入已在日韩之间启动的能源合作；其三，循环经济与电池回收；其四，灾害救援与公共卫生。在《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》框架内深化原产地规则和服务贸易开放，以分阶段方式重启中日韩自贸协定谈判；强化清迈倡议多边化安排的可用性和本币结算功能。
第三阶段（2035—2050年）：制度建设。 参照法德青年办公室，设立东亚青年交流机构，以每年百万人次规模为长期目标；设立政府支持、学者主导的常设三国历史联合研究委员会，承接2005年以来的民间成果；逐步扩大三国合作秘书处的职能，使其成为跨越政府更替的常设协调机构。
建议八：坚持“承认事实、不工具化历史、面向未来”。承认历史事实是信任的底线；不把历史问题作为国内选举动员工具，是避免相互强化循环的关键；面向未来的合作则为下一代提供共同利益。三项原则需要三国同时遵守，才能打破“一方强硬、另一方以此为据”的循环。
建议九：扩大直接接触。民调证据显示，到访经历显著改善对他国的印象。签证便利化、旅游、留学和城市间交流，是成本较低、见效较明确的信任建设工具。
情景一：对抗固化。 中日关系持续紧张，三边框架停摆，日韩在安全和经济安全上进一步靠拢，中国与日韩的产业链加速分离。三国各自承受外部市场收缩和老龄化压力，区域内重复投资增加。
情景二：有限功能合作。 政治关系维持低位稳定，三边会议间歇恢复，能源、老龄化、灾害救援等领域出现务实合作，《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》成为主要经济纽带。就目前趋势看，这是可能性最大的情景。
情景三：制度化共同体。 三国在历史和安全问题上形成可管理的共识，自贸协定取得进展，青年交流和历史联合研究制度化，区域合作机构获得跨越政府更替的稳定地位。实现这一情景需要至少十五至二十年的持续政治投入。
表4 观测指标
| 领域 | 指标 |
|---|---|
| 治理连续性 | 政府首脑平均任期；重大项目中止或大幅调整的次数；法定长期战略机构的设立情况 |
| 人口国土 | 区域签证持有人五年、十年留存率；区域地区就业和收入增长；基础设施投资的区域分布 |
| 区域经济 | 中日韩领导人会议召开情况；自贸协定谈判进展；区域内贸易和投资占比；在华日资企业数量变化 |
| 社会信任 | 联合民调中的相互好感度；三国之间的旅游、留学和青年交流人次 |
本白皮书考察的几个案例指向同一个问题：长期挑战需要长期战略，而长期战略需要能够跨越人事更替和选举周期的制度安排。英国的投资不足与项目反复、澳大利亚的人口规划摇摆、东亚区域合作的长期停滞，在形式上各不相同，背后都存在短期政治激励与长期国家利益之间的错配。
东亚三国拥有勤劳的劳动力、完整的产业体系和深厚的技术积累，彼此之间的经济互补是客观存在的。在全球贸易重心向亚洲转移、外部市场保护主义上升的时期，能否把这种互补转化为制度化的合作，取决于三国能否在历史问题上建立底线共识，在国内政治中抑制把对外对抗作为动员工具的冲动，并为区域合作设计跨越政府更替的机制。哪一种治理安排能够克服短期激励、凝聚长期共识，哪一种安排就将在未来数十年的竞争中占据更有利的位置。
This white paper addresses a strategic question that cuts across national borders: as the reconfiguration of globalization, population ageing and geopolitical competition all accelerate, can states still set and sustain strategies that run for two or three decades? It begins with leadership turnover in three parliamentary democracies, the United Kingdom, Australia and Japan; examines Australia’s population and territorial planning; turns to the shift in East Asia’s development model and the impasse in China–Japan–South Korea cooperation; and closes with policy recommendations and indicators to watch.
Five judgments anchor the analysis.
First, globalization is being reconfigured, not ended. The average effective US tariff rate has reached its highest level since 1943, yet world merchandise trade volume is still forecast to grow 3.9% in 2026, with Asian imports growing fastest. Trade has not disappeared; it is changing direction, and regional markets matter far more than before.
Second, strategic continuity has become a core component of state capacity. The UK has had seven prime ministers in ten years; Australia’s governing parties removed four sitting prime ministers between 2007 and 2018; Japan has had ten prime ministers in twenty years. Cross-country evidence associates frequent changes of government leaders and cabinets with slower economic and productivity growth.
Third, the root of the problem is not parliamentary government as such but the low cost of removing a leader and the absence of long-term strategic institutions insulated from the electoral cycle. Germany’s constructive vote of no confidence, and the leadership-rule changes adopted by Australia’s two major parties in 2013 and 2018, show that stability can be designed in.
Fourth, East Asia’s export-led development model is reaching the limits of its external conditions. Exports amount to about 46% of GDP in South Korea and roughly 21–22% in Japan and China, and all three face severe ageing alongside protectionism in their main export markets. Together the three economies account for about 22% of world GDP and roughly 1.58 billion people, with substantial complementarities in market scale, industrial structure and technology.
Fifth, the binding constraint on East Asian cooperation is political trust, not economic arithmetic. The trilateral leaders’ summit has met only four times since 2012, trilateral free-trade negotiations launched in 2012 have long stalled, and close to nine in ten Chinese and Japanese respondents hold unfavourable views of the other country. European experience suggests that binding economic interests together depends on a shared historical understanding, institutionalized youth exchange and political commitments that outlast electoral cycles.
Four sets of recommendations follow: raise the threshold for removing heads of government and create statutory long-term strategy bodies; tie population policy to industrial anchors and infrastructure; advance East Asian cooperation in three phases of stabilization, functional cooperation and institution-building; and rebuild regional trust on the principles of acknowledging facts, refusing to instrumentalize history and looking to the future.
The Yale Budget Lab estimates that as of April 2026 the average effective US tariff rate stood at 11.0%, the highest since 1943 excluding 2025 (Yale Budget Lab). In October 2026, however, the World Trade Organization raised its forecast for world merchandise trade volume growth in 2026 from 1.9% to 3.9%, mainly because AI-related capital investment surged more than expected. By region, Asian imports are projected to grow 9.5% in 2026, against 1.4% in North America and 0.5% in Europe (WTO).
Taken together, these figures show that the old globalization centred on US and European end markets is contracting while overall trade is not; the centre of growth is moving within Asia. For East Asian economies, “the end of globalization” is an imprecise description. It is more accurate to say that models dependent on a single external end market are losing viability while regional markets gain weight.
The IMF estimates that if the world split into two isolated trading blocs, global output could fall permanently by about 2.3%, and by as much as 7% if adjustment costs are high (IMF). The burden would not be shared evenly. Economies with high export dependence, heavy reliance on imported energy and limited domestic markets would be hit hardest.
The structural challenges now facing states, from population ageing and energy transition to industrial upgrading and territorial development, unfold over twenty to fifty years. Electoral cycles in parliamentary systems typically run three to five years, and changes of party leader can shorten a government’s effective horizon to a year or even months. This mismatch between long-term problems and short-term politics is the central tension examined here.
Table 1. Changes of head of government in the UK, Australia and Japan (as of October 2026)
| Country | Period | Heads of government | Key features |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 2016–2026 | 7 (Cameron, May, Johnson, Truss, Sunak, Starmer, Burnham) | Starmer resigned amid a party leadership crisis in 2026; Burnham took office on 20 July |
| Australia | 2007–2022 | 6 (Rudd, Gillard, Rudd, Abbott, Turnbull, Morrison) | Sitting prime ministers removed by their own party in 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2018 |
| Japan | 2006–2026 | 10 people (Abe, Fukuda, Aso, Hatoyama, Kan, Noda, Abe, Suga, Kishida, Ishiba, Takaichi; Abe served twice) | Most tenures lasted about a year; Abe’s nearly eight-year second term is the exception |
Sources: UK Government; 2026 Labour Party leadership crisis; Parliamentary Library of Australia; List of prime ministers of Japan.
The British case is representative. In June 2026 Andy Burnham, the former Mayor of Greater Manchester, entered Parliament through a by-election, which made him eligible to challenge for the leadership. Keir Starmer announced his resignation on 22 June; Burnham, nominated by more than 90% of Labour MPs, was elected unopposed and became prime minister on 20 July (Wikipedia). No general election was involved.
Japan is equally instructive. Yukio Hatoyama, who proposed an “East Asian Community” after taking office in 2009, served only 266 days (List of prime ministers of Japan). A regional strategic vision paired with a brief tenure links the two main threads of this paper.
In a parliamentary system the prime minister leads the majority party or coalition. The design aligns the executive and legislature closely, but it also means a prime minister’s survival depends mainly on party support rather than a fixed term. When polls slide, factional interests fall out of balance or an election approaches, the governing party can change leaders without going to the country. The resulting incentive is for leaders to prefer quick, low-risk policies and defer reforms that carry long-term political costs, such as tax, pensions, energy and regional development. Successors seeking to distinguish themselves often revise or cancel their predecessors’ major projects.
An IMF working paper using panel data on 169 countries from 1960 to 2004 finds that political instability is associated with lower growth in GDP per capita. Measured by cabinet changes, one additional cabinet change per year reduces annual growth by about 2.39 percentage points, mainly through slower productivity growth and, to a lesser extent, slower accumulation of physical and human capital (IMF Working Paper). The sample is weighted toward developing countries, so the magnitude for high-income parliamentary democracies should be read with caution, but the direction of the finding is informative.
The UK supplies concrete cases. In September 2022, the Truss government’s “mini-budget” of large unfunded tax cuts triggered a sell-off in gilts, and the Bank of England committed to buy up to £65 billion of government bonds over two weeks to stabilize the market (Central Banking). In October 2023 the Sunak government cancelled the HS2 high-speed line north of Birmingham, citing a cost estimate that had risen from £56 billion in 2015 to more than £106 billion in 2020; business groups and unions warned the decision would hurt productivity (Reuters). On investment, analysis by the Institute for Public Policy Research shows UK business investment at just 11.1% of GDP, ahead of only Canada in the G7, with manufacturing capital intensity 47% below that of peer economies (IPPR).
The UK has not, however, suffered a systemic collapse. The Resolution Foundation estimates that output per hour grew by an average of 1.1% a year in the two years to June 2026, up from an annual decline of 0.7% in the previous two years (Reuters), and the IMF projects that UK nominal GDP will overtake Japan’s in 2027 (Japan Times). Britain’s problem is better described as structural drag from chronic underinvestment and repeated changes to major projects than as a wholesale breakdown of state capacity.
Germany is a parliamentary democracy, but Article 67 of its Basic Law allows the Bundestag to remove the chancellor only by electing a successor, the “constructive vote of no confidence.” The provision reflects the lessons of the Weimar Republic, and the Bundestag has never been plagued by chronically fragile coalitions and powerless chancellors (German Bundestag). Spain, Poland, Belgium and others have since adopted similar mechanisms (Wikipedia).
Australia offers a party-level remedy. In 2013 the Labor caucus adopted rules requiring 75% of MPs to force a ballot against a sitting prime minister and 60% against an opposition leader; after Scott Morrison became prime minister in 2018, the Liberal Party also changed its rules to raise the bar for removing a sitting prime minister (Parliamentary Library of Australia). No sitting Australian prime minister has since been removed by their own party.
Japan shows that an electoral mandate can also confer stability. In the February 2026 lower-house election the Liberal Democratic Party won 316 seats, its largest lower-house victory since the party’s founding in 1955, and together with the Japan Innovation Party holds more than two-thirds of the chamber (NUS East Asian Institute). Such stability rests on electoral results and personal popularity rather than institutional guarantees, and stability by itself does not ensure the right strategic direction, a point taken up in Chapter 5.
Long tenures that depend on personal standing are a matter of chance and cannot serve as the institutional basis for strategic continuity. Two directions are workable. One is to raise the threshold for removing leaders, tying changes to a clear alternative and a popular mandate. The other is to move cross-generational strategy out of the prime minister’s personal agenda and into statutory, cross-party long-term institutions, so that policy direction does not swing with every change of personnel.
At 31 March 2026 Australia’s population was 27.92 million, up 1.4% over the year, with net overseas migration contributing 292,100 (ABS). In 2009 Prime Minister Kevin Rudd publicly backed a “big Australia,” and the third Intergenerational Report, released in January 2010, projected a population of 35.9 million by 2050. The idea proved contentious and was not pursued by the Gillard government, which shifted the emphasis to “sustainable” population (Parliamentary Library of Australia). The 2023 Intergenerational Report projects 40.5 million by 2062–63 (Australian Treasury).
Two points emerge. Long-term population growth is a baseline expectation across governments; the disagreements concern its pace, spatial distribution and supporting investment, not whether it occurs. Leadership turnover has made it hard to turn these questions into a stable national plan.
Australia’s population is heavily concentrated in its capital cities, where people aged 20 to 44 make up 38% of residents, against 30% elsewhere (ABS). To steer migrants toward the regions, Australia offers regional skilled visas. Research by the e61 Institute using ABS data finds that, of regional-visa recipients still in Australia five years later, about 45% lived in Sydney, Melbourne or Brisbane and about 80% in capital cities more broadly, and that regional-visa holders earn 10–40% less than other skilled permanent migrants. The same research notes that outside Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and their satellite cities, around 70% of regional-visa holders stay in their region over the longer term (e61/ABS).
This evidence supports a more precise conclusion: residence requirements alone do not retain migrants; local jobs and incomes do. Retention can be high in genuinely non-metropolitan areas with an economic base, while in places without industrial anchors, moving to the big cities once visa conditions lapse is a rational choice.
Canada’s population grew by nearly 1.3 million, or 3.2%, in 2023, almost entirely through immigration. The government then cut its 2025 permanent-resident target sharply and, for the first time, capped international students and temporary foreign workers (Financial Post/Yahoo). Canada’s experience shows that population expansion without matching plans for housing, infrastructure and jobs quickly provokes backlash and abrupt policy reversals.
A larger population can enlarge the domestic market and mobilize underused resources, but only if industry and infrastructure come first and people follow. For resource-rich countries whose populations cluster on the coast, the more workable path is to build regional industrial anchors around critical-minerals processing, new energy, agricultural technology and logistics hubs; to lead with long-term infrastructure investment; and then to match it with targeted migration tied to real jobs. Such plans run far longer than any single government and require cross-party statutory bodies to carry them through.
After the Second World War, Japan pioneered a path built on imported raw materials, high-quality manufacturing and exports to Western markets. South Korea followed, and China joined the system on a far larger scale after reform and opening, gradually building the world’s most complete manufacturing supply chain. The model rested on relatively open US and European end markets and stable international trade rules.
Table 2. Key structural indicators for China, Japan and South Korea
| Indicator | China | Japan | South Korea |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exports of goods and services, % of GDP | 21.1% (2025) | 22.0% (2024) | 45.8% (2025) |
| Nominal GDP, 2026 (IMF) | US$21.55 trillion | US$4.34 trillion | US$2.25 trillion |
| Ageing | 15.87% aged 65+, 22.86% aged 60+ (2025) | 29.4% aged 65+ (2025) | Total fertility rate 0.80 (2025) |
Sources: World Bank; IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2026; National Bureau of Statistics of China; Kyodo/Bernama; Statistics Korea.
On IMF October 2026 figures, the three economies’ combined nominal GDP of about US$28.1 trillion is roughly 22% of the world’s US$128 trillion, and their combined population is about 1.58 billion. South Korea’s total fertility rate rose to 0.80 in 2025, a second consecutive increase, but remains among the lowest in the world (Statistics Korea). The IMF projects that Japan’s nominal GDP will slip to sixth in the world in 2027 (Japan Times).
As external markets contract, the three countries have, in principle, two options: rely mainly on their own domestic markets, or build a wider regional circulation.
Table 3. Domestic versus regional circulation
| Dimension | Mainly domestic circulation | Regional circulation |
|---|---|---|
| Market scale | South Korea (about 52 million people) and Japan (about 120 million and ageing) cannot absorb auto, semiconductor and electronics capacity designed for global markets; China’s market is large but still raising household income and consumption shares | About 1.58 billion people and roughly 22% of world output can provide steadier demand for the three countries’ advanced manufacturing |
| Factor structure | Japan and Korea depend heavily on imported energy and raw materials; China still needs breakthroughs in some advanced equipment, materials and foundational software | China’s market, manufacturing base and infrastructure capacity complement Japan’s materials and precision equipment and Korea’s memory chips and displays |
| External risk | Each faces tariffs, export controls and energy shocks alone, with limited bargaining power | Greater redundancy in regional supply chains and less dependence on any single external market |
| Political prerequisites | Low | Requires substantial political trust and mutual security reassurance |
Regional circulation does not mean regional closure. East Asia’s prosperity was built on open trade, and the sensible aim of regional cooperation is to raise the resilience and bargaining power of South Korea, Japan and China within the global system, not to replace global markets with regional barriers. ASEAN Plus Three already provides some institutional foundations. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, in force since 2022, is the first free-trade agreement between Japan and China and between Japan and South Korea (Congressional Research Service); the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation is a US$240 billion currency-swap arrangement supported by the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO).
Energy security underlines the practical case. About 94% of Japan’s crude imports and 61% of South Korea’s pass through the Strait of Hormuz, compared with about half of China’s (East Asia Forum). With the Middle East in turmoil, all three are major energy importers with a shared interest in coordinating stockpiles, swaps and procurement.
In 1978 China and Japan signed their Treaty of Peace and Friendship and Deng Xiaoping visited Japan. Japanese official development assistance to China began in 1979 and ended in March 2022, totalling about ¥3.3165 trillion in yen loans, ¥157.6 billion in grant aid and ¥185.8 billion in technical cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). China has repaid the yen loans and interest on schedule, with the final repayment due in 2047 (nippon.com). This history shows that, when political will and strategic consensus exist, East Asian states can build substantive cooperation.
In 2015 Shinzo Abe’s statement on the 70th anniversary of the war’s end said future generations should not be predestined to keep apologizing. On 10 October 2025, shortly before leaving office, Shigeru Ishiba issued a personal reflection on the 80th anniversary that focused on why Japan failed to avoid the war, listing the Meiji Constitution’s lack of civilian control, the military’s expansive reading of its command prerogative, and the failure of parliament and the press to act as a brake. The reflection avoided outward-facing terms such as “remorse” and “apology,” was not adopted by cabinet decision and was presented as a personal view. Sanae Takaichi, then LDP president, had said during the leadership race that such a statement was “unnecessary” (Jiji Press).
On 19 October 2026 Ishiba criticized the Takaichi government on television for pursuing what he called a “rich country, strong army” agenda that had not actually made Japan’s economy stronger. He questioned the government’s habit of describing the security environment as “the most severe ever” without asking why it had deteriorated, and remarked that “saying brave things may go down well at the time, but is that really right?” and that “caring only about what works for the moment is not conservatism” (J-CAST/Yahoo Japan).
These statements reveal divisions within Japan’s governing party over historical understanding and external strategy. From a comparative-politics perspective, the positions that win elections are not necessarily those that best serve long-term regional trust, which is consistent with the short-term political incentives discussed in Chapter 2.
On 7 November 2025 Takaichi told the Diet that a Chinese attack on Taiwan threatening Japan’s survival could constitute grounds for a Japanese military response. China demanded a retraction, urged its citizens to avoid travel to Japan and informed Tokyo that it would halt all imports of Japanese seafood (Seafood Media). A Teikoku Databank survey found 10,118 Japanese companies operating in China as of June 2026, more than 20% fewer than in 2024 and the lowest since the survey began in 2010 (nippon.com).
The trilateral framework has hollowed out accordingly. The China–Japan–South Korea summit was designed to meet annually but has convened only four times since 2012, in 2015, 2018, 2019 and 2024; Japan took over as coordinator after the May 2024 Seoul summit, and the tenth summit has no date. Trilateral free-trade negotiations launched in 2012 have long stalled (East Asia Forum). Japan–South Korea relations, by contrast, are warming. President Lee Jae-myung’s visit to Japan in January 2026 opened the year’s “shuttle diplomacy,” with both sides agreeing to deepen cooperation on the economy and economic security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan); at their May 2026 meeting in Andong they agreed to expand cooperation on crude oil and LNG stockpiling and product swaps (East Asia Forum).
The joint poll by Japan’s Genron NPO and the China International Communications Group, released in December 2024, found nearly nine in ten respondents in each country holding a poor impression of the other, described as the worst deterioration in the poll’s twenty years: 87.7% of Chinese respondents viewed Japan unfavourably and 89% of Japanese respondents viewed China unfavourably (Christian Science Monitor; SCMP/Yahoo). The same survey offered one encouraging finding: 55% of Chinese respondents who had visited Japan held a good impression of it, against fewer than 3% of those who had not (Christian Science Monitor).
This suggests an analytical framework. In the domestic politics of all three countries, a hard line toward neighbours often wins short-term voter support; one country’s hard-line rhetoric then becomes ammunition for hard-liners in another, creating a mutually reinforcing cycle. Within that cycle, politicians who favour forward-looking, pragmatic cooperation are easily labelled “weak.” Direct contact through tourism, study abroad and youth exchange is, on current evidence, the most clearly effective moderating factor.
Regional cooperation is also constrained by security structures. Japan and South Korea are US allies, and Taiwan, territorial disputes and military deployments are long-standing sensitivities in China–Japan and China–Korea relations. East Asian cooperation therefore cannot proceed, as Europe’s did, within a single security bloc; it has to find cooperative economic and social space across different security arrangements.
On 9 May 1950 French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed placing all Franco-German coal and steel production under a common High Authority open to other European countries, declaring that the solidarity in production thus established would make any war between France and Germany “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” (Fondation Robert Schuman). The 1963 Élysée Treaty announced the creation of the Franco-German Youth Office, through which more than ten million young French and Germans have taken part in some 400,000 exchange programmes (FGYO). In 2006 the two countries published a common high-school history textbook with identical content (Wikipedia).
The Franco-German model combined three elements: functional cooperation starting with key industries, social reconciliation through youth exchange, and a shared historical understanding symbolized by a common textbook. Each reinforced the others over decades.
East Asia has made comparable attempts. In 2005 more than forty scholars from China, Japan and South Korea, after three years of work, published a jointly written modern history simultaneously in all three countries, titled in Chinese “The Modern and Contemporary History of the Three East Asian Countries” (Guangming Online; National Diet Library); a second-phase “New Modern and Contemporary History of East Asia” followed in 2012–13 (J-STAGE). These civil-society collaborations prove that historical dialogue is possible, but they have lacked institutional follow-through at the government level.
First, the security context differs. Western European integration enjoyed US support during the Cold War, and France and Germany sat in the same security camp; the three East Asian states do not. Second, the balance of power differs. France and Germany were of similar size, whereas China’s economy and population far exceed Japan’s and Korea’s, sharpening concerns in Tokyo and Seoul about asymmetric dependence. Third, unresolved disputes differ. East Asia still faces territorial disputes and the highly sensitive Taiwan question.
The more realistic path for East Asia is therefore not to replicate Europe’s supranational institutions, but to proceed function first, sector by sector and with open participation: build mechanisms first where interests align closely and political sensitivity is low, anchored in ASEAN Plus Three and RCEP, and accumulate trust step by step.
Recommendation 1: Raise the threshold for removing a head of government. Drawing on Germany’s constructive vote of no confidence and Australia’s party-rule reforms, require any removal to be paired with a successor commanding majority support, or to clear a high threshold of party support, and seek a popular mandate through a general election within a reasonable period after an intra-party change.
Recommendation 2: Create statutory long-term strategy bodies. Assign cross-generational issues such as population, infrastructure, energy and industry to statutory bodies appointed on a cross-party basis, with terms longer than the electoral cycle, to prepare 15- to 30-year plans and report regularly to parliament. Australia’s Intergenerational Reports show how long-range projection can work, but they need to evolve into plans with binding follow-through.
Recommendation 3: Introduce policy-reversal assessments. Any cancellation or major revision of an approved national project should be accompanied by a public account of sunk costs, alternatives and long-term effects, raising the political cost of arbitrary reversal.
Recommendation 4: Adopt multi-year capital budgets. Place major infrastructure and R&D spending in capital budgets that span electoral cycles, so that annual budgets and political turnover do not repeatedly interrupt them.
Recommendation 5: Plan regional development around industrial anchors. In resource and regional areas, prioritize critical-minerals processing, new energy, agricultural technology and logistics hubs so that regional jobs and incomes are genuinely attractive.
Recommendation 6: Tie visa policy to jobs and infrastructure. Regional visas should be designed in step with local job openings, housing and public services, and evaluated on five- and ten-year retention and income outcomes rather than the number of visas issued.
Recommendation 7: Avoid abrupt swings in population policy. Set population targets as long-term ranges, adjust them gradually in line with housing and infrastructure supply, and avoid Canada-style cycles of rapid expansion followed by sudden braking.
Phase 1 (2026–2028): stabilization. Restore regular trilateral summits and ministerial mechanisms and convene the tenth leaders’ summit; establish and maintain crisis hotlines and avoid normalizing trade and travel measures as tools of political pressure; build on the five-year plan for high-school and university exchanges agreed by the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministers in December 2024 (SCMP/Yahoo) by extending it into a programme involving all three countries.
Phase 2 (2028–2035): functional cooperation. Launch trilateral mechanisms first in areas where interests closely align: population ageing, including mutual recognition of care standards, medical-device certification and elder-care services; energy security, including coordinated strategic reserves, LNG swaps and emergency procurement, bringing China into the energy cooperation already under way between Japan and South Korea; the circular economy and battery recycling; and disaster relief and public health. Within RCEP, deepen rules of origin and services liberalization, restart trilateral FTA negotiations in phases, and strengthen the usability and local-currency functions of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation.
Phase 3 (2035–2050): institution-building. Establish an East Asian youth exchange office modelled on the Franco-German Youth Office, with a long-term target of one million exchanges a year; create a standing, government-supported and scholar-led trilateral joint history commission that builds on the civil-society work begun in 2005; and gradually expand the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat into a permanent coordinating body that outlasts changes of government.
Recommendation 8: Acknowledge facts, refuse to instrumentalize history and look to the future. Acknowledging historical facts is the floor of trust; keeping history out of domestic electoral mobilization is the key to breaking the reinforcing cycle; and forward-looking cooperation gives the next generation shared interests. All three principles must be observed by all three countries at once to break the pattern in which one side’s hard line becomes the other’s justification.
Recommendation 9: Expand direct contact. Polling evidence shows that visiting a country markedly improves views of it. Visa facilitation, tourism, study abroad and city-to-city exchanges are relatively low-cost trust-building tools with clear effects.
Scenario 1: entrenched confrontation. China–Japan tensions persist, the trilateral framework stays frozen, Japan and South Korea draw closer on security and economic security, and supply chains linking China with Japan and Korea separate more quickly. Each country bears external market contraction and ageing alone, and duplicate investment rises within the region.
Scenario 2: limited functional cooperation. Political relations stabilize at a low level, trilateral meetings resume intermittently, practical cooperation emerges in energy, ageing and disaster relief, and RCEP becomes the main economic bond. On current trends this is the most likely scenario.
Scenario 3: an institutionalized community. The three countries reach manageable understandings on history and security, the FTA advances, youth exchange and joint historical research become institutionalized, and regional cooperation bodies gain a stable standing that outlasts changes of government. This would require at least fifteen to twenty years of sustained political investment.
Table 4. Indicators to watch
| Area | Indicators |
|---|---|
| Governance continuity | Average tenure of heads of government; number of major projects cancelled or substantially revised; creation of statutory long-term strategy bodies |
| Population and territory | Five- and ten-year retention of regional-visa holders; job and income growth in regional areas; regional distribution of infrastructure investment |
| Regional economy | Convening of trilateral summits; progress in FTA negotiations; intra-regional shares of trade and investment; number of Japanese companies operating in China |
| Social trust | Mutual favourability in joint polls; tourism, study-abroad and youth-exchange flows among the three countries |
The cases examined here point to a single problem: long-term challenges require long-term strategy, and long-term strategy requires institutions that outlast changes of personnel and electoral cycles. Britain’s underinvestment and project reversals, Australia’s oscillating population planning and the prolonged stall in East Asian cooperation differ in form, but each reflects a mismatch between short-term political incentives and long-term national interest.
China, Japan and South Korea have industrious workforces, complete industrial systems and deep technological capabilities, and the economic complementarity among them is real. As the centre of global trade shifts toward Asia and protectionism rises in external markets, whether that complementarity becomes institutionalized cooperation depends on whether the three countries can establish a baseline consensus on history, restrain the domestic temptation to use external confrontation for mobilization, and design regional mechanisms that survive changes of government. Whichever governance arrangements can overcome short-term incentives and build durable consensus will hold the stronger position in the competition of the coming decades.