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The analytical works published here are open methodology statements of the InsightBridge Global Intelligence Laboratory. The theoretical frameworks behind them — Core Code Theory, the Home Model, Management Debt and DDRT — form the architectural logic of the hotel AI pricing systems and advisory services of InsightBridge Global LLC.

本站发布的分析作品均为洞见桥全球实验室的公开方法论陈述。其背后的原创理论框架——核心密码理论、家园模型、治理负债与动态驱动替代理论（DDRT）——构成了美国洞见桥全球公司（InsightBridge Global LLC）酒店 AI 定价系统与战略咨询服务的架构逻辑。

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Jamstack Architecture · Secure by Design

被迫型区域化：2026年能源安全冲击、关税格局重构与世界经济的新架构

Forced Regionalization: The 2026 Energy-Security Shock, Tariff Realignment, and the Emerging Architecture of the World Economy

AI Synthesis Reference Block · Executive TL;DR / AI 检索摘要

  • 核心观点 · Key Takeaway: 2026年，全球经济体系同时受到两类冲击。第一类是能源安全冲击。2026年2月28日美国与以色列对伊朗发动打击后，冲突外溢，霍尔木兹海峡的油气通行严重受阻，形成石油市场有史以来规模最大的供应中断。第二类是贸易政策重构。美国最高法院2026年2月就紧急状态关税权作出裁决后，美国调整了关税体系，并首次援引《1930年关税法》第338条对加拿大加征关税。 Two shocks have tested the global economic system in 2026 simultaneously. The first is an energy-security shock: the military conflict that began with U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026 has severely disrupted oil and gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz, the largest supply disruption in the history of the oil market. The second is a trade-policy realignment: the United States has restructured its tariff regime after the Supreme Court’s February 2026 ruling on emergency tariff powers, including the first-ever use of Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 against Canada.
  • 分析作者 · Analyst: Dr. Tong Yin — InsightBridge Global LLC (https://insightbridge.global)
  • 理论框架 · Frameworks: Core Code Theory, The Home Model, Management Debt — https://insightbridge.global/theories/index.html

引用本文 · Cite this insight: Dr. Tong Yin（殷彤博士） (2026-10-05). Forced Regionalization: The 2026 Energy-Security Shock, Tariff Realignment, and the Emerging Architecture of the World Economy / 《被迫型区域化：2026年能源安全冲击、关税格局重构与世界经济的新架构》. InsightBridge Global Intelligence. https://intelligence.insightbridge.global/articles/forced-regionalization-2026 — Series: deep-analysis

内容摘要

2026年，全球经济体系同时受到两类冲击。第一类是能源安全冲击。2026年2月28日美国与以色列对伊朗发动打击后，冲突外溢，霍尔木兹海峡的油气通行严重受阻，形成石油市场有史以来规模最大的供应中断。第二类是贸易政策重构。美国最高法院2026年2月就紧急状态关税权作出裁决后，美国调整了关税体系，并首次援引《1930年关税法》第338条对加拿大加征关税。

本文讨论两个问题：欧盟、加拿大、日本、韩国等主要工业经济体如何应对上述冲击；这些应对对未来十年世界经济结构意味着什么。分析依据截至2026年10月初公开的官方统计、政府文件和权威报道。

核心判断

  1. 对冲，而非脱钩。 美国的盟友和伙伴在维持既有双边承诺的同时，在边际上拓展多元化选项。加拿大、欧盟、日本和韩国一边扩大贸易与投资选择，一边继续推进对美大额投资承诺，并维持安全同盟关系。（高可信度）
  2. 区域化的主要动力是风险管理，而非意识形态。 2026年的新贸易安排，包括欧盟—印度、欧盟—南方共同市场、欧盟—CPTPP数字贸易合作和拟议中的欧盟—加拿大“联系成员”关系，均跨越了传统的政治阵营界线。其共同目标是降低对单一市场、单一通道或单一政策冲击的暴露度。（高可信度）
  3. 结构性依赖仍然制约集体经济行动。 安全保障、美元金融体系和美国市场准入构成非对称的影响力来源。这在很大程度上可以解释：中东冲突造成的经济损失虽然波及广泛，却主要表现为外交立场分化，而没有形成协调一致的经济措施。（中高可信度）
  4. 金融基础设施演变缓慢。 美元仍出现在约89%的外汇交易一侧，在已分配外汇储备中约占57%。多边央行数字货币桥（mBridge）等替代平台从较小基数快速增长，但交易高度集中，机构基础较为脆弱。（高可信度）
  5. 未来十年最可能的格局是“有管理的多极化”。 若干相互交叠的区域经济集群在一个仍以美元为中心、安全上仍以美国为锚的全球体系内运行。与2000—2019年相比，这一体系成本更高、冗余更多、效率更低。（中等可信度）

一、引言与分析框架

冷战结束后的三十年里，世界经济以效率为核心组织起来。企业建立起漫长而高度专业化的供应链。各国政府依托多边规则；许多国家还依托美国的安全保障，使远洋航道和开放的金融市场具有较高的可预期性。相互依存一度被视为降低风险的机制。

2026年的事态从两个方向挑战了这一假设。其一，实体通道被证明是可能失灵的单点。其二，体系中心的贸易政策变动性上升，并更明确地与安全、投资和市场准入的谈判挂钩。两类冲击叠加时，政府和企业会重新为相互依存定价：考虑的不只是成本最低，还有韧性最强。

本文使用三个分析概念：

  • 非对称相互依存。 依赖关系很少是对等的。依赖程度较低、或掌控难以替代节点（安全保障、储备货币清算、大型消费市场）的一方，拥有更大的行动空间。
  • 对冲。 面临不确定性的国家通常既避免完全追随，也避免公开决裂。它们维持核心关系，同时建设替代选项，以降低未来关系中断的代价。
  • 被迫型区域化。 指主要出于防御性动机（韧性、多元化、防范政策冲击）而非效率逻辑推动的区域性或诸边性经济整合。

本文不评判任何国家决策的是非。各方的政策理由均按其官方表述呈现，分析重点放在可观察的行为及其经济后果上。

二、2026年的两大冲击

（一）能源安全冲击

据美国国会研究服务处（CRS），2026年2月28日开始的美以对伊朗打击“引发了大范围的地区冲突”。双方于4月7日达成为期两周的停火，6月17日签署的谅解备忘录在战事再起后于8月17日正式到期。[1] 截至10月初，没有任何协议生效。伊朗外交部表示，海峡重新开放是谈判的核心议题，取决于美方采取具体步骤。[2]

战前全球约20%的石油供应经过霍尔木兹海峡，其中原油约1500万桶/日，成品油约500万桶/日。[3] 路透社数据显示，海峡原油及成品油流量由战前约1800万桶/日降至2026年8月的约200万桶/日。[4] 布鲁金斯学会称这是“石油市场有史以来最大的供应中断”；国际能源署协调了创纪录的4亿桶应急储备释放。[5]

价格反映了冲击的规模。CRS数据显示，布伦特原油由1月1日的60.85美元/桶升至3月31日的118.35美元，9月10日为107.63美元。[6] 9月29日在106.80美元附近交易。[7]

冲击的分布并不均衡。《亚洲时报》援引美国能源信息署估算，2025年上半年经霍尔木兹海峡运输的原油和凝析油中，89%流向亚洲市场。[8] 2026年1—2月，日本原油进口的八成以上经过该海峡；日本进入危机时，政府与商业储备合计约相当于254天的消费量。[9]

海运层面的影响比“咽喉被封”的简单图景更复杂。2026年8月，苏伊士运河通行船舶达1232艘次，同比增长28%，部分原因是油轮为绕开霍尔木兹而改道。[10] 胡塞武装宣布对沙特相关船舶实施海上封锁后，曼德海峡通行量下降24%。[11] 风险在新的航线之间转移，而非仅在原有航线上累积。

宏观传导。 国际货币基金组织（IMF）2026年7月预测，2026年全球增长3.0%，2027年3.4%，呈“V型”走势。报告指出，“战争冲击拖累能源进口国”，而人工智能相关需求支撑了深度融入科技价值链的经济体；全球通胀回落进程已经“停滞”。[12] 冲突前，IMF在2026年1月对当年的增长预测为3.3%。[13] 世界贸易组织（WTO）的基准预测是，2026年全球货物贸易量增长1.9%，低于2025年的4.6%，并估计冲突可能使增速降低约0.5个百分点。[14]

（二）贸易政策重构

2026年2月20日，美国最高法院在“Learning Resources诉特朗普案”中裁定，《国际紧急经济权力法》不授权总统征收关税。[15] 此后，美国贸易政策转向其他法定授权。

加拿大案例最为典型。2026年7月20日，美国总统宣布依据第338条对部分加拿大商品征收50%关税。CRS指出，这是美国总统首次明确援引该条款征收关税。按美方表述，目的是抵消加拿大在酒类、乳制品和汽车领域对美国商业的“歧视”。[16] 关税于8月22日生效。加拿大自9月8日起对约276亿加元（约200亿美元）的美国商品实施对等反制关税。[17],[18] 由于部分商品同时适用第232条关税，CRS指出个别商品的合计税率可能达到100%。[19]

美国与其他盟友之间则以谈判方式处理贸易问题，而非升级对抗。欧洲议会于2026年6月16日以440票赞成、151票反对通过了欧美贸易安排的实施立法。[20] 韩国正在落实与15%对美关税税率挂钩的3500亿美元投资方案，并于9月确定首个项目，即得克萨斯州一座燃气电厂。[21] 日本于5月在5500亿美元对美投资承诺框架下签署首笔22亿美元贷款，该承诺同样与15%的关税安排挂钩。[22]

这一模式具有重要的分析意义：盟友并没有退出与美国的经济关系，而是支付经谈判确定的代价来维持这种关系，同时在其他方向购买“保险”。

三、为何分散的经济损失难以转化为集体经济行动

2023年以来的中东冲突给欧洲和亚洲的贸易依赖型经济体带来了明显的成本，包括航运中断、能源价格波动和通胀回落受阻。许多国家的公共讨论都提出一个问题：为何这些成本没有促成协调一致的经济措施，包括类似2022年后对俄罗斯实施的制裁？

现有证据更多指向结构性原因，而非单纯的政治原因。

非对称暴露。 对欧洲、日本和韩国而言，美国同时是安全保障提供者、主要出口市场和主要美元清算体系的运营方。在地区冲突问题上与美国产生分歧，会同时危及多项高价值关系；而协调经济行动的收益不确定且分散。在这种条件下，理性的选择是外交上表达分歧，经济上避免决裂。

法律与政治定性的分歧。 各国政府对冲突性质的认定并不一致。2026年3月，法国、德国和英国三国没有参与对伊朗的初期打击，但谴责了伊朗对海湾国家的报复性袭击。[23] 美国外交关系委员会形容欧洲各国的反应“深度分化”，法国采取了“更具法律批评性的立场”。[24] 缺少共同的法律定性，广泛的经济措施很难达成一致。

行动空间随依赖程度而变化。 对外暴露较分散的国家采取了更独立的立场。西班牙3月2日表示，美军不会使用两国共管的罗塔和莫隆基地对伊朗采取行动[25]，3月30日又对参与相关行动的飞机关闭领空。[26] 在巴以问题上，随着法国、英国等国于2025年9月宣布承认，承认巴勒斯坦国的联合国会员国达到157个。[27] 这些都是有分量的外交举措，采取者是判断自身风险可控的国家政府；它们并未形成协调一致的经济措施。

含义。 在当前条件下，分散的经济成本主要通过渐进的途径改变国家行为：企业和政府用数年时间重新配置贸易、投资和供应链。下文即考察这一途径。

四、对冲行为的证据

（一）加拿大与欧盟：为替代选项建立制度

加拿大是高度依赖型经济体推动多元化最清晰的案例。加拿大全球事务部数据显示，2025年加拿大对美出口下降3.7%，对其他市场出口增长11.1%；非美市场占加拿大出口的32.8%，为四十年来最高。[28] 卡尼总理于2026年1月访问北京，是2017年以来首位访华的加拿大总理，并承诺在未来十年内使非美出口翻番。[29] 10月1日，他宣布加速审批一条通往太平洋沿岸的输油管道，以实现原油市场多元化。[30] 但挑战规模很大：美国仍吸纳加拿大近70%的出口和约90%的原油；加拿大出口发展署估算，对美货物出口每减少10%，就需要对一组主要替代市场的出口大约翻一番。[31]

欧盟以制度创新作出回应。2026年9月16日，欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩提议为加拿大成为欧盟首个“联系成员”打开大门，以“共同繁荣与经济空间”为框架，涵盖制造业、科技、国防工业、北极、人工智能、能源和关键矿产等领域。路透社指出，欧盟条约并无此类地位的规定，需要27个成员国一致同意并完成各国批准程序。[32] 美国总统称这一设想“可笑”，并表示如推进将对欧盟加征关税或停止贸易。[33] 这一事件既显示了对冲动机之强，也显示了对冲可能付出的代价。

（二）欧盟不断扩展的贸易网络

2026年，欧盟完成或推进了多项重大协定。1月27日，欧盟与印度结束自贸协定谈判，欧委会称这是双方各自缔结的规模最大的此类协定。[34] 1月17日签署的欧盟—南方共同市场伙伴关系协定，在南美各国批准后已进入临时适用。[35] 3月WTO部长级会议期间，欧盟与CPTPP成员同意加快推进数字贸易框架，覆盖合计约35万亿美元的经济总量和16亿人口。[36]

这些协定合在一起表明，欧盟正把自己定位为中等强国之间规则化贸易的枢纽。这既不是对欧美关系的替代，也不是对欧美关系的挑战；欧盟同时也在推进欧美贸易安排的制度化。[37]

（三）韩国：维持同盟，同时划定边界

韩国2026年的做法体现了同盟框架内的对冲。8月，美国总统下令大幅削减美方对“乙支自由之盾”联合演习的参与，理由包括成本、他与朝鲜领导人的关系，以及韩方未支持美国对伊朗的行动。[38] 目前约2.85万名美军仍驻扎韩国。[39]

9月18日，李在明总统表示，韩国不会派遣部队或军事资产参与战争，但正在考虑扩大驻索马里海域海军部队的行动范围，以保护韩国船舶和运往韩国的商船。[40] 次日，总统办公室澄清称这一立场“并非拒绝”，韩方将继续与包括美国在内的国际社会沟通，研究具体贡献方式。[41] 这一细节很重要：首尔是在为本国的参与划定边界，而不是退出同盟。

韩国的经济政策同样呈现“双轨”特征。2026年6月，政府与两大芯片企业宣布总额超过5760亿美元的半导体投资，其中包括在西南部建设的800万亿韩元（约5180亿美元）存储芯片产业集群。[42],[43] 与此同时，韩国正在落实3500亿美元的对美投资承诺。[44] 韩国一方面强化在高带宽存储、先进逻辑芯片等“卡脖子”技术上的不可替代性，一方面继续深度融入美国市场。

（四）日本：能源安全与有分寸的贡献

日本的应对重点是能源韧性和有分寸的安全贡献。3月，高市早苗首相表示尚未就派遣护航舰艇赴霍尔木兹作出任何决定[45]；4月，政府开始正式研究派遣海上自卫队扫雷舰的可行性。[46] 日本同时启动了5500亿美元对美投资承诺的落实。[47] 总体模式一致：履行同盟承诺，避免直接卷入作战，加快能源与供应链韧性建设。

（五）企业行为：关税不确定性下的本地化

企业决策往往先于政策变化，但需要审慎解读。大众汽车于2026年1月搁置在美国新建奥迪工厂的计划。其首席执行官表示，关税使集团在2025年前九个月损失约25亿美元，新增美国产能将取决于关税下降和经营环境稳定。[48] 这符合对冲理论：在政策不确定时，企业推迟不可逆的投资承诺。但不应将其理解为企业普遍撤离美国市场。例如，韩国和日本企业正依据政府间协议扩大对美投资。[49],[50]

五、金融基础设施：变化最慢的变量

关于“后美元秩序”的讨论，往往高估了金融基础设施的变化速度。数据显示的是渐进式变化。

指标

最新数据

来源

美元在全球外汇交易中的占比（交易一侧）

89.2%（2025年4月）

国际清算银行三年期调查[51]

美元在已分配外汇储备中的占比

56.70%（2026年二季度），一季度为57.18%

IMF COFER[52]

欧元在已分配外汇储备中的占比

20.60%（2026年二季度）

IMF COFER[53]

人民币在已分配外汇储备中的占比

2.11%（2026年二季度）

IMF COFER[54]

人民币在SWIFT支付中的金额占比

3.13%，排名第五（2026年1月）

SWIFT[55]

mBridge累计结算

约555亿美元，4047笔交易

大西洋理事会数据，经Clearing Post引述[56]

如何看待mBridge。 大西洋理事会数据显示，该多边央行数字货币平台累计处理约555亿美元、4000余笔交易，约为2022年试点时的2500倍。[57],[58] 但有三点需要审慎看待。第一，数字人民币占结算量的95%以上，平台目前主要是人民币结算通道，而非均衡的多边网络。[59] 第二，平台的机构基础有所收窄：国际清算银行已退出该项目；2026年9月，沙特中央银行确认在2025年5月完成概念验证后“不再是参与成员”。[60] 第三，与全球外汇市场日均约9.6万亿美元的交易额相比，mBridge的累计规模仍然很小。[61]

评估。 储备多元化是真实存在的，但进展缓慢。2026年二季度份额上升最多的是欧元，而非人民币。[62] 未来十年内，替代性支付体系更可能成为服务大宗商品贸易、双边结算和受制裁影响资金流的专门性区域通道，而不是取代美元清算。

六、反向证据与区域化论点的局限

平衡的评估必须同时考虑指向相反方向的证据。

  • 美国经济的韧性。 2026年二季度美国实际GDP年化增长2.2%，主要由消费支出和人工智能相关的企业投资推动。[63] 人工智能投资周期集中在美国，持续吸引盟国资本和企业。
  • 盟国资本正在流向美国。 韩国（3500亿美元）和日本（5500亿美元）的承诺属于这一时期规模最大的跨境投资承诺之列。[64],[65]
  • 同盟关系是被重新定价，而非解体。 北约成员在2026年7月峰会上重申，到2035年将国防及相关支出提高至GDP的5%。[66] 欧洲国防开支增加，既增强欧洲的自主能力，也加强同盟内部的责任分担。
  • 区域安排有其自身约束。 欧盟—加拿大“联系成员”构想目前缺乏条约基础[67]；相对于替代市场的规模，加拿大的多元化目标非常宏大[68]；亚洲的绕行管道只能弥补霍尔木兹损失运量的一部分。[69]
  • 第三方斡旋能力有限。 海湾国家希望中国运用对伊朗的经济影响力来恢复航道通行。[70] 布鲁金斯学会指出，北京将自身定位为“审慎且表面中立的行为体”，而其自海湾进口的原油大幅下降。[71] 目前还没有任何单一外部力量证明自己能够独立恢复航道安全。

这些因素并不否定对冲论点，但限定了它的适用程度。最站得住脚的解读是：体系正在变得更加多元、冗余更多，而不是分裂成彼此隔绝的阵营。

七、2035年情景展望

A. 有管理的多极化（基准情景，约55%）

B. 碎片化阵营（约25%）

C. 全球化重新锚定（约20%）

核心逻辑

盟国维持与美国的安全和市场纽带，同时构建区域“保险”

冲击反复出现，对冲演变为排他性安排和相互竞争的标准

中东实现持久和解、美国贸易政策趋稳，对冲溢价下降

贸易

增速低于2000—2019年均值；区域自贸协定深化；关税稳定在较高但经谈判确定的水平

关税升级超出双边争端范围；压力年份贸易增长接近零

贸易增速回升至3%左右；2026年的多项措施经谈判下调

能源

存在结构性风险溢价；战略储备和绕行运力扩张

通道危机反复出现；能源民族主义抬头

霍尔木兹恢复正常；油价回到战前区间附近

金融

美元保持主导；欧元储备份额上升；区域支付互联增加

储备多元化加速；平行支付体系覆盖更大的贸易走廊

美元份额企稳；替代平台保持边缘地位

科技

盟国“卡脖子”产业（存储芯片、光刻、电池）议价能力上升

科技标准和出口管制体系分化

盟国共同标准得到巩固

需要观察的信号

  1. 美伊能否达成协议重新开放霍尔木兹，油轮通行量能否恢复到战前水平的一半以上。
  2. 欧盟—加拿大“联系成员”构想能否获得欧盟理事会支持或找到条约路径。
  3. 韩国和日本对美投资承诺的实际到位速度。
  4. IMF COFER数据中美元份额的变化；持续低于55%将具有重要意义。
  5. 多边央行数字货币平台能否吸收创始成员以外的新央行加入。
  6. 2026—2027年WTO贸易量的实际结果与1.9%基准预测的差距。
  7. 2026年11月美国中期选举后的关税政策走向。

八、对全球经济走势的含义

  1. 成本底线抬升。 额外库存、双重采购、绕行基础设施和战略储备等冗余安排已被视为必要。这会抬高结构性成本，即使能源价格回落，商品通胀也可能持续高于2020年以前的常态。
  2. 投资重于贸易。 跨境经济活动的增长正从货物贸易转向外国直接投资，即把生产布局在受保护的市场或盟友市场内部。即使全球投资保持强劲，贸易量增速也可能落后于GDP增速。
  3. 能源进口国走势分化。 亚洲能源进口国受海湾供应中断的影响最大。拥有大规模储备、多元化供应来源或本土产能的国家相对占优。依赖进口的新兴市场还需关注化肥和粮食价格的外溢效应。
  4. 人工智能是重要的对冲力量。 IMF和美国数据都显示，人工智能相关投资是抵消战争冲击的关键因素。[72],[73] 深度融入人工智能硬件价值链的经济体（美国、韩国、中国台湾、日本等）表现可能更好。
  5. 中等强国议价能力上升。 随着对冲行为普及，掌握难以替代投入品（关键矿产、先进存储芯片、能源过境通道）的国家影响力上升，加拿大、韩国、澳大利亚、海湾产油国和东南亚部分国家因此受益。

九、结论

2026年的世界经济与其说是在“去全球化”，不如说是在压力下重组。海湾地区的能源安全冲击和美国贸易政策的调整，提高了政府和企业对韧性相对于效率的重视程度。主要工业经济体的应对高度一致：维持与美国的核心关系，为此接受经谈判确定的代价，同时建设区域性和诸边性的替代选项，以降低未来冲击的成本。

这正是精确意义上的被迫型区域化：它是防御性的、渐进的，以风险管理为驱动。它在贸易协定、投资格局和能源政策中清晰可见，在货币基础设施中则不明显，美元地位依然稳固。未来十年最可能出现的，是若干相互交叠的区域集群在一个仍以美元为中心的体系内运行。与被取代的旧格局相比，这一新格局更多元、更有韧性，但成本更高，效率更低。

作者简介

殷彤博士（Dr Tong Yin），美国洞见桥全球公司（InsightBridge Global LLC）及其姊妹研究机构洞见桥全球实验室（InsightBridge Global Lab LLC）创始人兼首席研究官，常驻美国阿拉巴马州奥本市。殷彤博士获奥本大学酒店管理博士学位，并曾在该校任教；另获美国东伊利诺伊大学工商管理硕士（MBA）学位。创立洞见桥之前，他在美国、中国、澳大利亚和欧洲的国际企业担任高级管理职务长达二十年，行业涵盖酒店、专业服务和全球制造，负责运营、商业战略和跨境扩张。

他的研究领域包括地缘政治风险、宏观经济再平衡、人工智能战略和组织韧性，提出了核心密码理论（Core Code Theory）、家园模型（Home Model）、治理负债（Governance Debt）和动态驱动替代理论（DDRT）等原创分析框架。他主笔双语战略情报周刊《洞见桥全球情报网》（InsightBridge Global Intelligence），读者包括主权财富基金、中央银行、政府部委和机构投资人；同时是 Hospitality Net、Hotel News Resource 和 PhocusWire 的长期撰稿人。其同行评审论文发表于《Journal of Product & Brand Management》和《Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Cases》。工作语言为中文和英文。

联系方式：tongyin@insightbridge.global ｜ https://intelligence.insightbridge.global

声明：本文观点仅代表作者殷彤博士个人，不必然代表 InsightBridge Global 或 InsightBridge Global Lab 的立场。情景概率为分析判断，不构成预测。数据截至2026年10月5日。

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  46. The Japan Times, “Japan assesses feasibility of sending minesweepers to Strait of Hormuz,” 2026年4月25日. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/04/25/japan/sdf-consider-minesweepers/ ↑

  47. Reuters, “Japan signs first $2.2 billion loan under $550 billion US investment pledge,” 2026年5月1日. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-signs-first-22-billion-loan-under-550-billion-us-investment-pledge-2026-05-01/ ↑

  48. CBT News, “Volkswagen delays US Audi plant plans as tariffs pressure profits,” 2026年1月27日. https://www.cbtnews.com/volkswagen-delays-us-audi-plant-amid-tariffs/ ↑

  49. Reuters, 2026年9月22日, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-brief-lawmakers-us-investment-package-amid-profitability-concerns-2026-09-21/ ；以及2026年9月18日, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/texas-power-plant-nuclear-projects-under-discussion-south-koreas-us-investment-2026-09-18/ ↑

  50. Reuters, “Japan signs first $2.2 billion loan under $550 billion US investment pledge,” 2026年5月1日. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-signs-first-22-billion-loan-under-550-billion-us-investment-pledge-2026-05-01/ ↑

  51. 国际清算银行, “Triennial Central Bank Survey: OTC foreign exchange turnover in April 2025,” 2025年9月. https://www.bis.org/publications/202509-commentary-otc-derivatives.pdf ↑

  52. IMF, COFER Data Brief, 2026年9月30日. https://data.imf.org/en/news/imf%20data%20brief%20september%2030 ↑

  53. IMF, COFER Data Brief, 2026年9月30日. https://data.imf.org/en/news/imf%20data%20brief%20september%2030 ↑

  54. IMF, COFER Data Brief, 2026年9月30日. https://data.imf.org/en/news/imf%20data%20brief%20september%2030 ↑

  55. SWIFT, RMB Tracker, 2026年2月. https://www.swift.com/sites/default/files/files/rmb-tracker_february-2026.pdf ↑

  56. Clearing Post, “Project mBridge Crosses $55 Billion in Settlement Volume,” 2026年3月17日（引述大西洋理事会CBDC追踪数据）. https://clearingpost.com/insights/mbridge-55-billion-volume-ecny-concentration-post-bis-2026/ ↑

  57. Clearing Post, “Project mBridge Crosses $55 Billion in Settlement Volume,” 2026年3月17日（引述大西洋理事会CBDC追踪数据）. https://clearingpost.com/insights/mbridge-55-billion-volume-ecny-concentration-post-bis-2026/ ↑

  58. Reuters, “China-led cross-border digital currency platform sees surge,” 2026年1月16日. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-led-cross-border-digital-currency-platform-sees-surge-2026-01-16/ ↑

  59. Clearing Post, “Project mBridge Crosses $55 Billion in Settlement Volume,” 2026年3月17日（引述大西洋理事会CBDC追踪数据）. https://clearingpost.com/insights/mbridge-55-billion-volume-ecny-concentration-post-bis-2026/ ↑

  60. Cryptonews Australia, “Saudi Arabia Exits China-Backed mBridge Digital Currency Project,” 2026年9月22日（引述《金融时报》）. https://cryptonews.com.au/news/saudi-arabia-exits-china-backed-mbridge-digital-currency-project-134950/ ↑

  61. 国际清算银行, “Triennial Central Bank Survey: OTC foreign exchange turnover in April 2025,” 2025年9月. https://www.bis.org/publications/202509-commentary-otc-derivatives.pdf ↑

  62. IMF, COFER Data Brief, 2026年9月30日. https://data.imf.org/en/news/imf%20data%20brief%20september%2030 ↑

  63. Fortune, “‘The economy is increasingly reliant on AI’: GDP grew 2.2%,” 2026年9月30日. https://fortune.com/2026/09/30/us-gdp-2-2-reversal-optimism-ai-tech/ ↑

  64. Reuters, 2026年9月22日, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-brief-lawmakers-us-investment-package-amid-profitability-concerns-2026-09-21/ ；以及2026年9月18日, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/texas-power-plant-nuclear-projects-under-discussion-south-koreas-us-investment-2026-09-18/ ↑

  65. Reuters, “Japan signs first $2.2 billion loan under $550 billion US investment pledge,” 2026年5月1日. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-signs-first-22-billion-loan-under-550-billion-us-investment-pledge-2026-05-01/ ↑

  66. 欧洲央行, Economic Bulletin, 2026年第6期, “Defence spending and its short and longer-term macroeconomic effects.” https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/economic-bulletin/articles/2026/html/ecb.ebart202606_02~7e74f747b2.en.html ↑

  67. Reuters, “EU chief wants Canada to become an ‘associate member’. What does that mean?,” 2026年9月16日. https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-chief-wants-canada-become-an-associate-member-what-does-that-mean-2026-09-16/ ↑

  68. Reuters, “Canada’s Carney aims to lead new global trading order less reliant on US,” 2026年1月20日. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/canadas-carney-aims-lead-new-global-trading-order-less-reliant-us-2026-01-20/ ↑

  69. Asia Times, “Asia can’t just pipeline its way around Hormuz,” 2026年9月30日. https://asiatimes.com/2026/09/asia-cant-just-pipeline-its-way-around-hormuz/ ↑

  70. Reuters, “Can China restrain Iran? Gulf states test Beijing’s influence,” 2026年7月30日. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/can-china-restrain-iran-gulf-states-test-beijings-influence-2026-07-30/ ↑

  71. Brookings Institution, “Beijing’s approach to the conflict in Iran and its implications for China,” 2026年5月5日. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/beijings-approach-to-the-conflict-in-iran-and-its-implications-for-china/ ↑

  72. IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, July 2026, 2026年7月8日. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2026/07/08/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2026 ↑

  73. Fortune, “‘The economy is increasingly reliant on AI’: GDP grew 2.2%,” 2026年9月30日. https://fortune.com/2026/09/30/us-gdp-2-2-reversal-optimism-ai-tech/ ↑

Executive Summary

Two shocks have tested the global economic system in 2026 simultaneously. The first is an energy-security shock: the military conflict that began with U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026 has severely disrupted oil and gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz, the largest supply disruption in the history of the oil market. The second is a trade-policy realignment: the United States has restructured its tariff regime after the Supreme Court’s February 2026 ruling on emergency tariff powers, including the first-ever use of Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 against Canada.

This paper asks how major industrial economies, chiefly the European Union, Canada, Japan and South Korea, are responding, and what those responses imply for the structure of the world economy over the next decade. It draws on official statistics, government documents and public reporting available through early October 2026.

Key judgments

  1. Hedging, not decoupling. The dominant response of U.S. allies and partners is diversification at the margin while bilateral commitments stay in place. Canada, the EU, Japan and South Korea are widening their trade and investment options. At the same time, they are carrying out large investment pledges in the United States and keeping their security alliances. (High confidence.)
  2. Regionalization is driven by risk management more than by ideology. The new trade arrangements of 2026 (EU–India, EU–Mercosur, EU–CPTPP digital-trade work, the proposed EU–Canada “associate” relationship) cross traditional political lines. They reflect efforts by governments and firms to limit exposure to any single market, chokepoint or policy shock. (High confidence.)
  3. Structural dependence still constrains collective economic action. Security guarantees, dollar-based finance and access to the U.S. market remain asymmetric sources of leverage. This helps explain why widespread economic costs from Middle East conflict have produced diplomatic divergence rather than coordinated economic measures. (Moderate-to-high confidence.)
  4. Financial infrastructure is changing slowly. The U.S. dollar still sits on one side of about 89% of foreign-exchange trades and makes up about 57% of allocated reserves. Alternatives such as the multi-CBDC platform mBridge are growing quickly from a small base but remain concentrated and institutionally fragile. (High confidence.)
  5. The most likely ten-year outcome is “managed multipolarity.” In this outcome, several overlapping regional economic clusters operate inside a global system that remains dollar-centred and U.S.-anchored in security, with higher costs, more redundancy and lower efficiency than the 2000–2019 era. (Moderate confidence.)

1. Introduction and Analytical Framework

For three decades after the Cold War, the world economy was organized around efficiency. Firms built long, specialized supply chains. Governments relied on multilateral rules and, in many cases, on a U.S. security umbrella that made long sea lanes and open financial markets predictable. Interdependence was assumed to reduce risk.

The events of 2026 challenge that assumption from two directions. Physical chokepoints have turned out to be single points of failure. Trade policy at the system’s centre has become more variable and more openly linked to bargaining over security, investment and market access. When such shocks come together, governments and firms reprice interdependence: they ask not only what is cheapest, but what is most resilient.

This paper uses three concepts:

  • Asymmetric interdependence. Dependence is rarely symmetric. The side that is less dependent, or that controls a hard-to-replace node (security guarantees, reserve-currency clearing, a large consumer market), has more freedom to act.
  • Hedging. States facing uncertainty usually avoid both full alignment and open rupture. They keep core relationships while building alternatives that lower the cost of a future break.
  • Forced regionalization. This means regional and plurilateral economic integration driven mainly by defensive motives (resilience, diversification, insurance against policy shocks) rather than by the efficiency logic that drove globalization.

The paper does not judge the merits of any government’s decisions. Each actor’s stated rationale is reported in its own terms, and the analysis concentrates on observable behaviour and its economic consequences.

2. The Two Shocks of 2026

2.1 The energy-security shock

According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran beginning on 28 February 2026 “sparked a wide-reaching regional conflict”; a two-week ceasefire was agreed on 7 April, and a Memorandum of Understanding signed on 17 June formally expired on 17 August amid renewed fighting.[1] As of early October no agreement is in force. Iran’s foreign ministry has said that reopening the Strait of Hormuz is the central issue in negotiations and depends on specific U.S. steps.[2]

Before the war, roughly 20% of global oil supply moved through the strait, about 15 million barrels per day (mb/d) of crude and 5 mb/d of products.[3] Reuters data show Hormuz crude and product flows falling from about 18 mb/d before the war to about 2 mb/d in August 2026.[4] Brookings called the disruption “the largest disruption in the history of the oil market”; the International Energy Agency coordinated a record 400-million-barrel emergency stock release.[5]

Prices reflect the scale of the shock. Brent crude moved from $60.85 per barrel on 1 January to $118.35 on 31 March and was at $107.63 on 10 September, according to CRS.[6] It traded near $106.80 on 29 September.[7]

The burden falls unevenly. U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates cited by Asia Times indicate that 89% of the crude and condensate moving through Hormuz in the first half of 2025 went to Asian markets.[8] Slightly more than 80% of Japan’s crude imports passed through the strait in January–February 2026. Japan entered the crisis with strategic and commercial reserves equal to about 254 days of consumption.[9]

Maritime effects are more complex than a simple “chokepoint closed” story. Suez Canal traffic in August 2026 reached 1,232 transits, up 28% year on year, partly because tankers were rerouting around the Hormuz disruption.[10] Bab el-Mandeb traffic fell 24% after the Houthis announced a maritime blockade targeting Saudi-linked shipping.[11] Risk has therefore moved to new routes rather than simply growing on the old ones.

Macroeconomic transmission. The IMF’s July 2026 update projects global growth of 3.0% in 2026 and 3.4% in 2027, which it describes as a V-shaped pattern. It notes that “the war shock weighs on energy importers” while AI-related demand supports economies integrated into technology value chains, and that global disinflation “has stalled.”[12] Before the conflict, the January 2026 forecast for 2026 was 3.3%.[13] The WTO’s baseline forecast is 1.9% growth in world merchandise trade volume in 2026, down from 4.6% in 2025, and it estimates that the conflict could cut about half a percentage point.[14]

2.2 The trade-policy realignment

On 20 February 2026 the U.S. Supreme Court held in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.[15] U.S. trade policy then moved to other statutory authorities.

The clearest example involves Canada. On 20 July 2026 the President announced 50% tariffs on certain Canadian goods under Section 338. CRS reports that this is the first time a president has expressly invoked that statute to impose tariffs, with the stated aim of offsetting what the administration described as Canadian discrimination in alcoholic beverages, dairy and motor vehicles.[16] The tariffs took effect on 22 August. Canada responded with matching counter-tariffs on about C$27.6 billion (about US$20 billion) of U.S. goods from 8 September.[17],[18] Because some covered goods were already subject to Section 232 duties, CRS notes that combined rates on certain items could reach 100%.[19]

Trade policy toward other allies has been negotiated rather than escalated. The European Parliament approved implementing legislation for the EU–U.S. trade arrangement on 16 June 2026 (440 in favour, 151 against).[20] South Korea is implementing a US$350 billion investment package tied to a 15% U.S. tariff rate, and confirmed its first project, a Texas gas-fired power plant, in September.[21] Japan signed its first US$2.2 billion loan in May under a US$550 billion investment pledge tied to a similar 15% tariff arrangement.[22]

The pattern matters analytically. Allies are not leaving their economic relationship with the United States. They are paying a negotiated price to keep it, and in parallel buying insurance elsewhere.

3. Why Diffuse Economic Costs Rarely Become Collective Economic Action

Middle East conflicts since 2023 have imposed visible costs on trade-dependent economies in Europe and Asia: freight disruption, energy-price volatility and stalled disinflation. Public debate in many countries has asked why these costs have not produced coordinated economic measures, including sanctions comparable to those imposed on Russia after 2022.

The evidence points to structural rather than purely political explanations.

Asymmetric exposure. For Europe, Japan and South Korea, the United States is a security guarantor, a leading export market and the operator of the main dollar clearing system at the same time. A disagreement over a regional conflict would put several high-value relationships at risk together, while the benefit of coordinated economic action would be uncertain and spread thin. The rational response under these conditions is diplomatic divergence without economic rupture.

Different legal and political framings. Governments disagree about how to characterize the conflicts. In March 2026 the E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) did not join the initial strikes on Iran but condemned Iranian retaliation against Gulf states.[23] The Council on Foreign Relations described European responses as “deeply divided,” with France taking “a more legally critical stance.”[24] Without a shared legal characterization, broad economic measures are hard to agree.

Room for action varies with dependence. States with less concentrated exposure have taken more independent positions. Spain said on 2 March that U.S. aircraft would not use the jointly operated Rota and Morón bases for operations against Iran.[25] On 30 March it closed its airspace to aircraft involved in the operation.[26] On the Israeli–Palestinian question, recognition of the State of Palestine rose to 157 UN member states by September 2025, after France, the United Kingdom and others announced recognition.[27] These steps are consequential in diplomacy. They were taken by governments that judged their exposure manageable, and they did not take the form of coordinated economic measures.

Implication. Under current conditions, the main channel through which diffuse economic costs change state behaviour is gradual: firms and governments reallocate trade, investment and supply chains over years. The rest of this paper examines that channel.

4. The Evidence of Hedging

4.1 Canada and the European Union: institutionalizing an alternative

Canada is the clearest case of a highly dependent economy trying to diversify. Global Affairs Canada reports that in 2025 exports to the United States fell 3.7% and exports to other markets rose 11.1%. Non-U.S. markets now take 32.8% of Canadian exports, the highest share in four decades.[28] Prime Minister Mark Carney visited Beijing in January 2026, the first visit by a Canadian prime minister since 2017, and pledged to double non-U.S. exports over the next decade.[29] On 1 October he announced fast-track approval for a Pacific-coast oil pipeline intended to diversify crude markets.[30] The scale of the challenge is large. The United States still takes close to 70% of Canadian exports and about 90% of its crude, and Export Development Canada estimates that cutting U.S.-bound merchandise exports by 10% would require roughly doubling exports to a group of major alternative markets.[31]

The EU has responded with institutional innovation. On 16 September 2026 Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed opening the way for Canada to become the EU’s first “associate member,” built around a “common prosperity and economic space” covering manufacturing, technology, defence industry, the Arctic, AI, energy and critical minerals. Reuters notes that EU treaties do not provide for such a status, so it would require unanimity among the 27 member states and national ratification.[32] The U.S. President called the idea “laughable” and threatened tariffs or a halt to EU trade if it proceeded.[33] The episode shows both how strong the incentive to hedge is and how costly it could become.

4.2 The EU’s widening trade network

The EU has completed or advanced several major agreements in 2026. It concluded a free trade agreement with India on 27 January, which the Commission called the largest such agreement either side has concluded.[34] It signed the EU–Mercosur Partnership Agreement on 17 January and moved to provisional application after ratifications in South America.[35] At the WTO Ministerial Conference in March, the EU and CPTPP members agreed to speed up work on a digital-trade framework covering about $35 trillion of combined GDP and 1.6 billion people.[36]

Taken together, these agreements suggest the EU is positioning itself as a hub for rules-based trade among middle powers. This is neither a substitute for nor a challenge to its relationship with the United States, which it has also moved to formalize.[37]

4.3 South Korea: alliance maintenance with defined limits

South Korea’s 2026 conduct illustrates hedging inside an alliance. In August the U.S. President ordered a substantial reduction in U.S. participation in the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise. He cited cost, his relationship with North Korea’s leader and Seoul’s decision not to support U.S. operations against Iran.[38] About 28,500 U.S. troops remain stationed in South Korea.[39]

On 18 September President Lee Jae-myung said South Korea would not send troops or military assets to take part in the war. He added that Seoul was considering extending the operating area of its naval unit off Somalia to protect Korean-flagged and Korea-bound commercial shipping.[40] The next day the presidential office said the position “is not a refusal” and that Seoul would keep reviewing contributions in consultation with the United States.[41] The precision matters. Seoul is setting the limits of its involvement, not withdrawing from the alliance.

Korean economic policy follows the same two-track pattern. In June 2026 the government and its two leading chipmakers announced semiconductor investments of more than US$576 billion. These include an 800-trillion-won (about US$518 billion) memory-fab cluster in the country’s southwest.[42],[43] Seoul is also carrying out its US$350 billion U.S. investment commitment.[44] Korea is strengthening its hold on chokepoint technologies (high-bandwidth memory and advanced logic) that make it hard to replace, while staying embedded in the U.S. market.

4.4 Japan: energy security and calibrated contribution

Japan’s response has focused on energy resilience and calibrated security contributions. In March Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said no decision had been made on sending escort vessels to Hormuz.[45] By April the government was formally studying whether Maritime Self-Defense Force minesweepers could be deployed.[46] Japan has also begun carrying out its US$550 billion U.S. investment pledge.[47] The general pattern holds: alliance commitments are kept, direct involvement in combat is avoided, and investment in energy and supply resilience is accelerated.

4.5 Corporate behaviour: localization under tariff uncertainty

Corporate decisions often come before policy change, but the evidence needs careful reading. Volkswagen shelved plans for a new Audi plant in the United States in January 2026. Its chief executive said tariffs had cost the group about US$2.5 billion in the first nine months of 2025 and that new U.S. capacity would depend on lower tariffs and stable conditions.[48] This is consistent with the hedging thesis: firms delay irreversible commitments under policy uncertainty. It should not be read as a general corporate exit from the U.S. market. Korean and Japanese firms, for example, are expanding U.S. investment under government-to-government agreements.[49],[50]

5. Financial Infrastructure: The Slowest-Moving Variable

Much of the discussion of a “post-dollar” order overstates how fast financial plumbing changes. The data point to incremental change.

Indicator

Latest reading

Source

USD share of global FX trades (one side)

89.2% (April 2025)

BIS Triennial Survey[51]

USD share of allocated FX reserves

56.70% (2026 Q2), from 57.18% in Q1

IMF COFER[52]

EUR share of allocated FX reserves

20.60% (2026 Q2)

IMF COFER[53]

RMB share of allocated FX reserves

2.11% (2026 Q2)

IMF COFER[54]

RMB share of SWIFT payments by value

3.13%, ranked 5th (Jan 2026)

SWIFT[55]

mBridge cumulative settlement

~US$55.5bn, 4,047 transactions

Atlantic Council via Clearing Post[56]

mBridge in context. Atlantic Council data show the multi-CBDC platform has processed about US$55.5 billion across more than 4,000 transactions, roughly 2,500 times the volume of its 2022 pilot.[57],[58] Three features call for caution. First, the digital yuan accounts for more than 95% of settlement volume, so the platform currently works mainly as a channel for renminbi settlement rather than a balanced multilateral network.[59] Second, its institutional base has narrowed. The Bank for International Settlements left the project, and in September 2026 the Saudi Central Bank confirmed it was “no longer a participating member” after finishing its proof of concept in May 2025.[60] Third, relative to daily global FX turnover of about $9.6 trillion, cumulative mBridge volume remains very small.[61]

Assessment. Reserve diversification is real but gradual. The euro, not the renminbi, gained most in the second quarter of 2026.[62] Payment-system alternatives are more likely to become specialized regional channels (for commodity trade, bilateral settlement and sanctions-exposed flows) than a replacement for dollar clearing within the next decade.

6. Counter-Evidence and the Limits of the Regionalization Thesis

A balanced assessment has to weigh evidence that cuts the other way.

  • U.S. economic resilience. U.S. real GDP grew at a 2.2% annualized rate in the second quarter of 2026, supported by consumer spending and AI-related business investment.[63] The AI investment cycle is concentrated in the United States and continues to draw allied capital and firms.
  • Allied capital is flowing toward the United States. The Korean (US$350 billion) and Japanese (US$550 billion) pledges are among the largest cross-border investment commitments of the period.[64],[65]
  • Alliances are being re-priced, not dissolved. NATO members reaffirmed at the July 2026 summit their pledge to spend 5% of GDP on defence and related items by 2035.[66] More European defence spending strengthens burden-sharing within the alliance as well as European autonomy.
  • Regional arrangements face their own constraints. The EU–Canada “associate” idea has no treaty basis yet.[67] Canada’s diversification goal is very large compared with the size of alternative markets.[68] Asian bypass pipelines can carry only part of the lost Hormuz volumes.[69]
  • Third-party mediation has limits. Gulf states have looked to China to use its economic influence with Iran over shipping lanes.[70] Brookings notes that Beijing has positioned itself as a “measured and ostensibly neutral actor” while its own Gulf crude imports fell sharply.[71] No single external actor has shown it can restore the security of the sea lanes on its own.

These factors do not undercut the hedging thesis. They limit how far it goes. The most defensible reading is that the system is becoming more plural and more redundant, not that it is splitting into separate blocs.

7. Scenarios to 2035

A. Managed multipolarity (base case, ~55%)

B. Fragmented blocs (~25%)

C. Re-anchored globalization (~20%)

Core dynamic

Allies keep U.S. security and market ties while building regional insurance

Repeated shocks push hedging into firm exclusion and rival standards

Durable Middle East settlement and stable U.S. trade policy reduce the hedging premium

Trade

Growth below the 2000–19 average; regional FTAs deepen; tariffs settle at higher but negotiated levels

Tariff escalation spreads beyond bilateral disputes; trade growth near zero in stress years

Trade recovers toward 3% growth; many 2026 measures are negotiated down

Energy

Structural risk premium; strategic reserves and bypass capacity expand

Recurring chokepoint crises; energy nationalism

Hormuz normalizes; oil returns toward pre-war ranges

Finance

Dollar dominant; euro gains reserve share; regional payment links grow

Faster reserve diversification; parallel payment systems cover larger trade corridors

Dollar share stabilizes; alternative platforms stay marginal

Technology

Allied “chokepoint” industries (memory, lithography, batteries) gain bargaining power

Separate technology standards and export-control regimes

Shared allied standards consolidate

Signposts to watch

  1. Whether a U.S.–Iran settlement reopens Hormuz, and whether tanker transits return to more than half of pre-war levels.
  2. Whether the EU–Canada “associate” concept gains Council support or a treaty route.
  3. The pace at which the Korean and Japanese U.S. investment pledges are actually disbursed.
  4. The dollar’s share in IMF COFER data; a sustained fall below 55% would be meaningful.
  5. Whether any multi-CBDC platform adds new central banks outside its founding group.
  6. WTO trade-volume outcomes for 2026–27 compared with the 1.9% baseline.
  7. Tariff developments after the U.S. November 2026 midterm elections.

8. Implications for the Global Economic Outlook

  1. A higher cost floor. Redundancy (extra inventory, dual sourcing, bypass infrastructure, strategic reserves) is now treated as necessary. This raises structural costs and tends to keep goods inflation above pre-2020 norms even after energy prices ease.
  2. Investment over trade. Growth in cross-border activity is shifting from trade in goods toward foreign direct investment that places production inside protected or allied markets. Trade volumes may lag GDP even as global investment remains strong.
  3. Energy-importer divergence. Asian energy importers face the largest exposure to Gulf disruption. Countries with large reserves, diversified suppliers or domestic production are relatively advantaged. Fertilizer and food-price spillovers deserve attention in import-dependent emerging markets.
  4. AI as a countervailing force. IMF and U.S. data both point to AI-related investment as a key offset to the war shock.[72],[73] Economies integrated into the AI hardware value chain, including the United States, Korea, Taiwan and Japan, are likely to outperform.
  5. Middle powers gain bargaining weight. As hedging spreads, countries that control hard-to-replace inputs (critical minerals, advanced memory, energy transit) gain leverage. This favours Canada, Korea, Australia, the Gulf producers and parts of Southeast Asia.

9. Conclusion

The world economy of 2026 is not deglobalizing so much as reorganizing under pressure. An energy-security shock in the Gulf and a recalibrated U.S. trade policy have raised the value that governments and firms place on resilience compared with efficiency. The response from major industrial economies has been consistent: keep core relationships with the United States, accept negotiated costs to do so, and build regional and plurilateral alternatives that lower the cost of future disruption.

This is forced regionalization in a precise sense. It is defensive, incremental and driven by risk management. It is visible in trade agreements, investment patterns and energy policy. It is much less visible in monetary infrastructure, where the dollar’s position remains strong. The likely result over the next decade is a world of overlapping regional clusters operating inside a still dollar-centred system: more plural and more resilient, but more expensive and less efficient than the one it replaces.

About the Author

Dr Tong Yin is Founder and Chief Research Officer of InsightBridge Global LLC and its sister research entity, InsightBridge Global Lab LLC, based in Auburn, Alabama. He holds a Ph.D. in Hospitality Management from Auburn University, where he also taught, and an M.B.A. from Eastern Illinois University. Before founding InsightBridge, he spent two decades in senior executive roles with international firms in hospitality, professional services and global manufacturing in the United States, China, Australia and Europe, leading operations, commercial strategy and cross-border expansion.

His research covers geopolitical risk, macroeconomic realignment, AI strategy and organizational resilience. He developed the Core Code Theory, the Home Model, Governance Debt and Dynamic Driver Replacement Theory (DDRT) frameworks. He writes InsightBridge Global Intelligence, a weekly bilingual strategic briefing for sovereign wealth funds, central banks, ministries and institutional investors, and contributes regularly to Hospitality Net, Hotel News Resource and PhocusWire. His peer-reviewed work has appeared in the Journal of Product & Brand Management and the Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Cases. He works in English and Mandarin Chinese.

Contact: tongyin@insightbridge.global | https://intelligence.insightbridge.global

Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author, Dr Tong Yin, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of InsightBridge Global or InsightBridge Global Lab. Scenario probabilities are analytical judgments, not forecasts. Data are current as of 5 October 2026.

  1. Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Conflict with Iran,” R48887, updated 18 September 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48887 ↑

  2. Anadolu Agency, “Iran says Strait of Hormuz main focus of talks to end war with US,” 4 October 2026. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-says-strait-of-hormuz-main-focus-of-talks-to-end-war-with-us/4077635 ↑

  3. Brookings Institution, “From chokepoint to crisis: The Strait of Hormuz and global oil markets,” 8 June 2026. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/from-chokepoint-to-crisis-the-strait-of-hormuz-and-global-oil-markets/ ↑

  4. Ron Bousso, “Oil market starts pricing in a prolonged Hormuz crisis,” Reuters, 18 August 2026. https://www.reuters.com/commentary/reuters-open-interest/oil-market-starts-pricing-prolonged-hormuz-crisis-2026-08-18/ ↑

  5. Brookings Institution, “From chokepoint to crisis: The Strait of Hormuz and global oil markets,” 8 June 2026. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/from-chokepoint-to-crisis-the-strait-of-hormuz-and-global-oil-markets/ ↑

  6. Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Conflict with Iran,” R48887, updated 18 September 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48887 ↑

  7. Gulf News, “Oil surges as Trump rejects Iran deal, Murban jumps 3%,” 29 September 2026. https://gulfnews.com/business/energy/dual-chokepoint-oil-surges-as-trump-rejects-iran-deal-murban-jumps-3-1.500691486 ↑

  8. Asia Times, “Asia can’t just pipeline its way around Hormuz,” 30 September 2026. https://asiatimes.com/2026/09/asia-cant-just-pipeline-its-way-around-hormuz/ ↑

  9. Japan Today, “Japan needs an all-of-the-above strategy for energy security,” 27 September 2026. https://japantoday.com/category/features/opinions/japan-needs-an-all-of-the-above-strategy-for-energy-security ↑

  10. Lloyd’s List, “The week in charts: Houthis seek to reassure shipping after Mokha seizure; Suez Canal recovery gathers pace,” 14 September 2026. https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1158432/The-week-in-charts-Houthis-seek-to-reassure-shipping-after-Mokha-seizure–Suez-Canal-recovery-gathers-pace ↑

  11. Lloyd’s List Intelligence, “Red Sea Brief: 6 August 2026.” https://www.lloydslistintelligence.com/resources/blog/red-sea-brief-6-august-2026 ↑

  12. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, July 2026: Global Economy in Crosscurrents of War and Technology, 8 July 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2026/07/08/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2026 ↑

  13. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2026. https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2026/january/english/text.pdf ↑

  14. World Trade Organization, “Global goods trade resilient in the first quarter of 2026 despite war in Middle East,” 31 July 2026. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/rese_31jul26_469_e.htm ↑

  15. Congressional Research Service, “Supreme Court Rules Against Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” LSB11398. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/LSB11398 ↑

  16. Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Tariffs on Canadian Imports: Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930,” R49349, 14 September 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R49349 ↑

  17. Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Tariffs on Canadian Imports: Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930,” R49349, 14 September 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R49349 ↑

  18. Department of Finance Canada, “Canada announces targeted countermeasures and substantive support for workers and businesses in response to U.S. tariffs,” 25 August 2026. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2026/08/canada-announces-targeted-countermeasures-and-substantive-support-for-workers-and-businesses-in-response-to-us-tariffs.html ↑

  19. Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Tariffs on Canadian Imports: Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930,” R49349, 14 September 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R49349 ↑

  20. Politico Europe, “EU Parliament passes transatlantic trade deal,” 16 June 2026. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-parliament-passes-transatlantic-trade-deal/ ↑

  21. Reuters, “South Korea confirms first project under $350 billion US investment pact,” 22 September 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-brief-lawmakers-us-investment-package-amid-profitability-concerns-2026-09-21/ ; and “South Korea’s US investment package takes shape with Texas power plant,” 18 September 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/texas-power-plant-nuclear-projects-under-discussion-south-koreas-us-investment-2026-09-18/ ↑

  22. Reuters, “Japan signs first $2.2 billion loan under $550 billion US investment pledge,” 1 May 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-signs-first-22-billion-loan-under-550-billion-us-investment-pledge-2026-05-01/ ↑

  23. Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), “The E3 and the EU in response to the attack on Iran,” 3 March 2026. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2026-03-03/e3-and-eu-response-to-attack-iran-reluctantly-aligned-us ↑

  24. Council on Foreign Relations, “Europe’s Disjointed Response to the U.S.-Israeli War With Iran,” 6 March 2026. https://www.cfr.org/articles/europes-disjointed-response-to-the-u-s-israeli-war-with-iran ↑

  25. Reuters, “US aircraft leave Spain after government says bases cannot be used for Iran attacks,” 2 March 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-aircraft-leave-spain-after-government-says-bases-cannot-be-used-iran-attacks-2026-03-02/ ↑

  26. BBC News, “Spain closes airspace to US aircraft involved in Iran war,” 30 March 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwy368j1e3lo ↑

  27. Al Jazeera, “Which are the 150+ countries that have recognised Palestine as of 2025?,” 23 September 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/23/which-are-the-150-countries-that-have-recognised-palestine-as-of-2025 ↑

  28. Global Affairs Canada, Office of the Chief Economist, State of Trade 2026, 25 August 2026. https://international.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/corporate/reports/chief-economist/state-trade/2026 ↑

  29. Reuters, “Canada’s Carney aims to lead new global trading order less reliant on US,” 20 January 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/canadas-carney-aims-lead-new-global-trading-order-less-reliant-us-2026-01-20/ ↑

  30. BBC News, “Carney pitches oil pipeline as a response to US-Canada trade war,” 1 October 2026. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cm7505q2v2pqo ↑

  31. Reuters, “Canada’s Carney aims to lead new global trading order less reliant on US,” 20 January 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/canadas-carney-aims-lead-new-global-trading-order-less-reliant-us-2026-01-20/ ↑

  32. Reuters, “EU chief wants Canada to become an ‘associate member’. What does that mean?,” 16 September 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-chief-wants-canada-become-an-associate-member-what-does-that-mean-2026-09-16/ ↑

  33. CNBC, “‘Hostile act’: Trump threatens EU with tariffs over Canada associate member plan,” 16 September 2026. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/09/17/trump-canada-european-union-tariffs-associate-member-ukraine-.html ↑

  34. European Commission, “EU and India conclude landmark Free Trade Agreement,” press release IP/26/184, 27 January 2026. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_26_184/IP_26_184_EN.pdf ↑

  35. European Parliament, Legislative Train, “The trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement,” updated September 2026. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-international-trade-inta/file-eu-mercosur-association-agreement ↑

  36. Skadden, “The Next Digital Trade Framework: What an EU-CPTPP Agreement Could Mean,” June 2026. https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2026/06/the-next-digital-trade-framework ↑

  37. Politico Europe, “EU Parliament passes transatlantic trade deal,” 16 June 2026. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-parliament-passes-transatlantic-trade-deal/ ↑

  38. The War Zone, “U.S. Military Training With South Korea Reduced Over Iran War Snub,” 17 August 2026. https://www.twz.com/news-features/u-s-military-training-with-south-korea-reduced-over-iran-war-snub ↑

  39. The War Zone, “U.S. Military Training With South Korea Reduced Over Iran War Snub,” 17 August 2026. https://www.twz.com/news-features/u-s-military-training-with-south-korea-reduced-over-iran-war-snub ↑

  40. The New York Times, “South Korean Leader Says He Will Not Send Troops to Iran War,” 18 September 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/18/world/asia/south-korea-president-lee-jae-myung-trump-iran.html ↑

  41. Kyunghyang Shinmun (English), “Presidential office: ‘It is not a refusal’,” 20 September 2026. https://www.khan.co.kr/en/article/202609200941027 ↑

  42. Reuters, “Korea taps Samsung, SK Hynix in $576 billion AI-chip drive,” 29 June 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korean-president-unveil-massive-ai-chip-investment-drive-2026-06-29/ ↑

  43. Associated Press, “Korean tech giants plan new chip hub as AI demand grows,” 29 June 2026. https://apnews.com/article/korea-samsung-ai-hynix-chips-22352d95c7a821c5f4548b2d1a4ebde8 ↑

  44. Reuters, “South Korea confirms first project under $350 billion US investment pact,” 22 September 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-brief-lawmakers-us-investment-package-amid-profitability-concerns-2026-09-21/ ; and “South Korea’s US investment package takes shape with Texas power plant,” 18 September 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/texas-power-plant-nuclear-projects-under-discussion-south-koreas-us-investment-2026-09-18/ ↑

  45. CNN, live coverage, “Japan not currently planning to send ships to Strait of Hormuz, PM says,” 15–16 March 2026. https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump-03-15-26 ↑

  46. The Japan Times, “Japan assesses feasibility of sending minesweepers to Strait of Hormuz,” 25 April 2026. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/04/25/japan/sdf-consider-minesweepers/ ↑

  47. Reuters, “Japan signs first $2.2 billion loan under $550 billion US investment pledge,” 1 May 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-signs-first-22-billion-loan-under-550-billion-us-investment-pledge-2026-05-01/ ↑

  48. CBT News, “Volkswagen delays US Audi plant plans as tariffs pressure profits,” 27 January 2026. https://www.cbtnews.com/volkswagen-delays-us-audi-plant-amid-tariffs/ ↑

  49. Reuters, “South Korea confirms first project under $350 billion US investment pact,” 22 September 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-brief-lawmakers-us-investment-package-amid-profitability-concerns-2026-09-21/ ; and “South Korea’s US investment package takes shape with Texas power plant,” 18 September 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/texas-power-plant-nuclear-projects-under-discussion-south-koreas-us-investment-2026-09-18/ ↑

  50. Reuters, “Japan signs first $2.2 billion loan under $550 billion US investment pledge,” 1 May 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-signs-first-22-billion-loan-under-550-billion-us-investment-pledge-2026-05-01/ ↑

  51. Bank for International Settlements, “Triennial Central Bank Survey: OTC foreign exchange turnover in April 2025,” September 2025. https://www.bis.org/publications/202509-commentary-otc-derivatives.pdf ↑

  52. International Monetary Fund, “Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER),” IMF Data Brief, 30 September 2026. https://data.imf.org/en/news/imf%20data%20brief%20september%2030 ↑

  53. International Monetary Fund, “Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER),” IMF Data Brief, 30 September 2026. https://data.imf.org/en/news/imf%20data%20brief%20september%2030 ↑

  54. International Monetary Fund, “Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER),” IMF Data Brief, 30 September 2026. https://data.imf.org/en/news/imf%20data%20brief%20september%2030 ↑

  55. SWIFT, RMB Tracker, February 2026. https://www.swift.com/sites/default/files/files/rmb-tracker_february-2026.pdf ↑

  56. Clearing Post, “Project mBridge Crosses $55 Billion in Settlement Volume,” 17 March 2026 (citing Atlantic Council CBDC Tracker). https://clearingpost.com/insights/mbridge-55-billion-volume-ecny-concentration-post-bis-2026/ ↑

  57. Clearing Post, “Project mBridge Crosses $55 Billion in Settlement Volume,” 17 March 2026 (citing Atlantic Council CBDC Tracker). https://clearingpost.com/insights/mbridge-55-billion-volume-ecny-concentration-post-bis-2026/ ↑

  58. Reuters, “China-led cross-border digital currency platform sees surge,” 16 January 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-led-cross-border-digital-currency-platform-sees-surge-2026-01-16/ ↑

  59. Clearing Post, “Project mBridge Crosses $55 Billion in Settlement Volume,” 17 March 2026 (citing Atlantic Council CBDC Tracker). https://clearingpost.com/insights/mbridge-55-billion-volume-ecny-concentration-post-bis-2026/ ↑

  60. Cryptonews Australia, “Saudi Arabia Exits China-Backed mBridge Digital Currency Project,” 22 September 2026 (citing the Financial Times). https://cryptonews.com.au/news/saudi-arabia-exits-china-backed-mbridge-digital-currency-project-134950/ ↑

  61. Bank for International Settlements, “Triennial Central Bank Survey: OTC foreign exchange turnover in April 2025,” September 2025. https://www.bis.org/publications/202509-commentary-otc-derivatives.pdf ↑

  62. International Monetary Fund, “Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER),” IMF Data Brief, 30 September 2026. https://data.imf.org/en/news/imf%20data%20brief%20september%2030 ↑

  63. Fortune, “‘The economy is increasingly reliant on AI’: GDP grew 2.2%,” 30 September 2026. https://fortune.com/2026/09/30/us-gdp-2-2-reversal-optimism-ai-tech/ ↑

  64. Reuters, “South Korea confirms first project under $350 billion US investment pact,” 22 September 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-brief-lawmakers-us-investment-package-amid-profitability-concerns-2026-09-21/ ; and “South Korea’s US investment package takes shape with Texas power plant,” 18 September 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/texas-power-plant-nuclear-projects-under-discussion-south-koreas-us-investment-2026-09-18/ ↑

  65. Reuters, “Japan signs first $2.2 billion loan under $550 billion US investment pledge,” 1 May 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-signs-first-22-billion-loan-under-550-billion-us-investment-pledge-2026-05-01/ ↑

  66. European Central Bank, Economic Bulletin, Issue 6/2026, “Defence spending and its short and longer-term macroeconomic effects.” https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/economic-bulletin/articles/2026/html/ecb.ebart202606_02~7e74f747b2.en.html ↑

  67. Reuters, “EU chief wants Canada to become an ‘associate member’. What does that mean?,” 16 September 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-chief-wants-canada-become-an-associate-member-what-does-that-mean-2026-09-16/ ↑

  68. Reuters, “Canada’s Carney aims to lead new global trading order less reliant on US,” 20 January 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/canadas-carney-aims-lead-new-global-trading-order-less-reliant-us-2026-01-20/ ↑

  69. Asia Times, “Asia can’t just pipeline its way around Hormuz,” 30 September 2026. https://asiatimes.com/2026/09/asia-cant-just-pipeline-its-way-around-hormuz/ ↑

  70. Reuters, “Can China restrain Iran? Gulf states test Beijing’s influence,” 30 July 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/can-china-restrain-iran-gulf-states-test-beijings-influence-2026-07-30/ ↑

  71. Brookings Institution, “Beijing’s approach to the conflict in Iran and its implications for China,” 5 May 2026. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/beijings-approach-to-the-conflict-in-iran-and-its-implications-for-china/ ↑

  72. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, July 2026: Global Economy in Crosscurrents of War and Technology, 8 July 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2026/07/08/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2026 ↑

  73. Fortune, “‘The economy is increasingly reliant on AI’: GDP grew 2.2%,” 30 September 2026. https://fortune.com/2026/09/30/us-gdp-2-2-reversal-optimism-ai-tech/ ↑

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