Reading the £10 Billion Ledger

How much of the new British and Dutch support for Ukraine will actually arrive

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On 28 October, London and The Hague made pledges to Ukraine on the same day. In his 2026 Budget speech, Chancellor John Healey announced more than £10 billion of additional economic and military support, which the government called the largest single package of financial backing Britain has ever given Kyiv [1][2]. In The Hague, Prime Minister Rob Jetten met President Volodymyr Zelensky and announced a €500 million winter military package, alongside €1.2 billion of non-military aid over the next three years [7][8].

With American support for Ukraine shrinking, it is tempting to read these announcements as Europe taking over the baton, or even squaring up to Washington. But for any fiscal pledge, the headline number is only the starting point. What matters is where the money comes from, what form it takes, and how much of it eventually reaches Ukraine. Taken apart line by line, Britain's package tells a more interesting story than its headline.

How the £10 Billion Is Built

According to the Treasury, the package has three parts [1][2]. The first is £7 billion of economic support over three years, made up of up to £5.5 billion in guarantees for World Bank lending and a £500 million grant to the crisis facility of the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA), which the government expects to mobilise £1.5 billion for Ukraine. The second is a £3 billion increase in UK Export Finance (UKEF) capacity for Ukraine, from £3.5 billion to £6.5 billion, prioritised for military support. The third is £500 million of additional military aid to shore up Ukraine's air defences this winter.




Figure 1. Composition of the UK's "£10 billion" package

Reclassify those parts by whether they require the Treasury to spend cash now, and the picture sharpens. Only the £500 million in military aid and the £500 million IDA grant are direct cash outlays, about £1 billion in total and less than a tenth of the package. The £5.5 billion in World Bank guarantees is a contingent liability: as long as Ukraine keeps up its repayments, Britain pays nothing. The £3 billion in export finance is underwriting capacity: when Ukraine uses it to buy from British companies, it takes on commercial loans guaranteed by the UK, and Ukraine is the debtor.

The Chancellor was candid about this. He told MPs the £10 billion would be "based on loans, export finance guarantees and half a billion in urgent military funding for this winter" [3]. The question "Can Britain really find £10 billion?" is therefore aimed at the wrong target. Britain has not promised £10 billion in cash. It has promised to use its sovereign credit to unlock roughly £10 billion of financing capacity for Ukraine.

The World Bank Link: The Most Misunderstood Piece

The largest component is the £5.5 billion in World Bank guarantees, and it attracts the most common objections. Why would the World Bank lend to a country at war? Couldn't the United States, as the largest shareholder, simply veto it?

Start with the mechanics. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the World Bank's lending arm, makes a loan to Ukraine and Britain guarantees it. Parliamentary papers show that if Ukraine falls 180 days behind on a repayment, the UK assumes responsibility for both principal and interest, with guarantees expected to run for as long as 29 years [11]. The Bank is no longer assessing Ukraine's creditworthiness; it is assessing Britain's. For other shareholders, the default risk has been transferred to the UK, and the Bank's own balance sheet takes on no meaningful additional exposure.

Then consider the votes. As the Congressional Research Service explains, major decisions at the IBRD, such as amending its Articles of Agreement, require 85% of voting power, which gives the United States, with roughly 16%, a veto. Approving individual loans, however, requires only a simple majority of 50%, and the United States cannot unilaterally block routine project approvals [14]. To stop a loan, Washington would have to persuade management not to bring it to the board, or assemble a majority against it.

Most important is the track record. Guaranteeing World Bank loans to Ukraine is not a new British invention; it has been standard practice since 2022. Government figures show that the UK has provided up to £4.1 billion of fiscal support to Ukraine through World Bank loan guarantees since the full-scale invasion [12]. In June 2026, the World Bank board approved a $3.39 billion development policy operation for Ukraine in which a $1.04 billion loan was backed by a Japan-supported credit-enhancement fund and a $500 million British guarantee [10]. On 1 October, the government announced World Bank approval of a further $1 billion in UK-backed financing [13]. The board has approved such operations repeatedly over four years, including under the current U.S. administration.




Figure 2. World Bank decision thresholds and U.S. voting power

The real uncertainty in this component, then, is not whether the money will be lent but how fast. Britain's earlier $5 billion guarantee commitment was deployed in tranches of roughly $1 billion a year [12][13]. The new package envisages using up to £5.5 billion within three years, about £1.8

billion a year, a much faster pace. Each guarantee needs a World Bank operation that is ready to go, and those operations typically carry reform conditions. The IMF has twice this year voiced concern about the slow pace of reform in Ukraine's parliament [16][17].

Export Finance: Defence Orders and New Ukrainian Debt

The second-largest component is the £3 billion in export finance. It is the easiest part to criticise as money that never leaves Britain: Ukraine receives a credit line, and the cash ends up with British companies.

That is broadly accurate. UKEF financing has supported more than 5,000 air-defence missiles from Thales in Belfast, nuclear fuel from Urenco, the reconstruction of six bridges in the Kyiv region, and the transfer of former Royal Navy mine-countermeasure vessels [5]. The Thales missile contract alone is worth about £2.5 billion and supports hundreds of jobs in Northern Ireland [19]. Transactions must meet a minimum of 20% UK content [19], and Ukraine borrows on favourable terms over 15 years [20].

But focusing only on the money flowing back to Britain misses the other side of the mechanism. It solves Ukraine's problem of needing weapons now without being able to pay up front. For a country at war, long-term, low-interest loans for urgently needed air-defence missiles are far more realistic than waiting for grants that may never arrive. For Britain, the instrument combines aid, industrial policy and jobs, which makes it easier to defend in Parliament and before voters.

What deserves attention is the risk signal. In a letter to the Business Secretary, UKEF's Accounting Officer wrote that the agency was "close to capacity" against its existing £3.5 billion Ukraine limit [4]. Because Ukraine business already falls outside the Treasury's minimum credit-risk standards, the increase was made through a ministerial direction on national-interest grounds [4][6]. That tells us two things. Demand is real, since the old limit has been filled with orders and the new £3 billion has an identifiable pipeline. And the government is fully aware of the credit risk and has chosen to override professional risk advice with a political decision. The practice is not unusual, but it is a reminder that whether the £3 billion is used depends on how much more debt Ukraine is willing and able to take on.

Can Britain's Public Finances Bear It?

Britain's fiscal position is genuinely tight. Public sector net debt passed £3 trillion for the first time at the end of September 2026, about 94% of GDP [21]. The Office for Budget Responsibility estimates that headroom against the fiscal rules has fallen from £23.6 billion in March to £15 billion, and debt interest is expected to reach £109 billion this year [22][23].

Yet that very tightness explains why Britain chose guarantees and credit. Roughly £1 billion of cash is affordable, and guarantees cost nothing in cash unless Ukraine defaults. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact notes that such guarantees involve no up-front payment and are not counted against the current aid budget. In the event of default, payouts would come

from future aid budgets; for the earlier $5 billion of guarantees, the maximum annual payout was put at around $375 million, equivalent to about 3% of the aid budget at the time [12]. The new £5.5 billion raises that potential burden substantially, but it is a long-term contingent liability spread over two to three decades, not a one-off cash hole.

So the claim that “Britain has no money” and the conclusion that “the package can be delivered” are not in conflict. Britain’s fiscal constraints are precisely why it is substituting credit for cash, and precisely why the package could pass in a Budget at all.

The Netherlands: What Is New and What Is Not

The Dutch package is more conventional, consisting largely of direct appropriations, and its delivery is correspondingly more certain. The €500 million winter package will buy air-defence equipment and drones [7][8], while the €1.2 billion in non-military aid will be disbursed at roughly €380 million in 2027 and €410 million in each of 2028 and 2029, for energy repairs, reconstruction and Dutch companies taking part in rebuilding [8].

Little of it, however, is genuinely new money. According to Dutch reporting, the €500 million comes from the more than €3 billion of military support the cabinet had already reserved for Ukraine [9]. Of the €1.2 billion, about €878 million comes from the coalition agreement and €327 million had already been announced in September [9]. That does not diminish the value of Dutch support, since money already in the budget is often more reliable than fresh rhetoric, but it shows that the announcement mainly assigns existing funds to specific projects rather than adding new fiscal commitments.

Delivery Odds, Component by Component

On the basis of the evidence above, each part of the British package can be assessed separately. The probabilities below are the author’s estimates, drawn from public information and historical pace, of how much of each component will have turned into usable funding for Ukraine by the end of 2029.

Component	Amount	Nature	Author’s estimated delivery	Main basis
Winter air-defence aid	£0.5bn	Cash	About 95%	Paid directly from the defence budget; clear purpose
IDA grant and leverage	£1.5bn (incl. £0.5bn grant)	Cash plus leverage	About 75%	Grant is certain; leverage depends on other donors
World Bank loan guarantees	Up to £5.5bn	Contingent liability	About 70%	Proven mechanism, but a faster pace than before; depends on projects and reforms
Export finance capacity	£3.0bn	Credit capacity	About 60%	Real demand, but depends on Ukraine’s appetite and capacity for debt
Total	About £10.5bn	—	About 70%, or £7–8bn	Weighted estimate




Figure 3. Headline amounts vs. expected delivery by component

That yields three distinct conclusions.

First, if the question is whether Britain will honour its commitment, the odds are high, above 90%. The guarantees and credit lines require no cash to be raised, the budget lines and ministerial direction are in place, and Britain’s record over the past four years has been consistent.

Second, if the question is how much financing Ukraine will actually receive, the realistic figure over three years is £7–8 billion rather than the full £10.5 billion. The shortfall comes mainly from two places: how fast the World Bank guarantees are deployed, and whether the export-finance capacity is filled with orders.

Third, if the question is how much British taxpayers will actually pay, the certain cash cost is about £1 billion. The rest becomes a fiscal cost only if Ukraine defaults, and even then it would be spread over two or three decades.

The Variables That Really Matter

How much of this money materialises will depend less on British rhetoric or American votes at the World Bank than on a handful of more concrete variables.

The first is the IMF review timetable. The Fund aims to complete the combined second and third reviews of Ukraine's $8.1 billion Extended Fund Facility by the end of the year, provided reforms resume and partners deliver sufficient and credible financing assurances [16][17]. Britain's three-year commitment is an important part of those assurances. If the review goes smoothly, World Bank operations can proceed on schedule; if it slips, so will the pace at which guarantees are used.

The second is Ukraine's capacity to carry debt. Guaranteed loans and export credits both end up as Ukrainian liabilities, and the IMF has stressed that new financing must be consistent with debt sustainability [17]. The EU's €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan covers much of the financing need for 2026 and 2027 [15], but Ukraine's draft 2027 budget assumes a longer war, which raises the requirement [17]. The heavier the debt load, the more cautious Kyiv will be about new borrowing.

The third is the course of the war and of negotiations. A ceasefire or substantive progress in talks would shift needs from air defence and munitions to reconstruction, and the mix of export credit would shift with it. An escalation would fill the military lines faster.

The fourth is Washington's posture. The United States cannot unilaterally veto World Bank loans; its influence works through management's agenda and board consensus. So far, the World Bank has continued to approve UK-guaranteed operations for Ukraine under the current administration [10][13], and the State Department has approved a Patriot missile sale to Ukraine that uses no U.S. funds and is financed by European partners [18]. For now, Washington's stance looks closer to "we won't pay, but we won't block", and that is exactly the space in which the British package operates.

Conclusion

Britain's £10 billion is neither an empty promise nor a pile of cash. It is a piece of financial engineering that converts sovereign credit into financing capacity: with about £1 billion in cash and several billion pounds of long-term contingent liabilities, Britain unlocks funding for Ukraine

many times larger than its own cash outlay. It can be delivered, but what is being delivered is mainly access to finance for Ukraine, not spending by the Treasury.

For Europe, the significance goes beyond Britain. In an era of stretched public finances and receding American aid, European governments are learning to support Ukraine with guarantees, credit and the balance sheets of multilateral institutions rather than direct appropriations. The approach is sustainable and politically cheaper; the price is that risk is deferred and Ukraine carries more debt. To judge pledges of this kind, the better question is not how big the number is, but what form the money takes, when it arrives, and who ultimately bears the cost.

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